#### Explanation of Cosmopolitanism

Appiah 06

2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. <http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev_4_08_Appiah_Review.pdf> //QM

Behind much of the grumbling about the cultural effects of globalization is an image of how the world used to be—an image that is both unrealistic and unappealing. Our guide to what is wrong here might as well be another African. Publius Terentius Afer, whom we know as Terence, was born a slave in Carthage in North Africa, and taken to Rome in the late second century AD. Before long, his plays were widely admired among the city’s literary elite; witty, elegant works that are, with Plautus’s earlier, less cultivated works, essentially all we have of Roman comedy. Terence’s own mode of writing—his free incorporation of earlier Greek plays into a single Latin drama—was known to Roman littérateurs as “contamination.” It’s a suggestive term. When people speak for an ideal of cultural purity, sustaining the authentic culture of the Asante or the American family farm, I find myself drawn to contamination as the name for a counter-ideal. Terence had a notably firm grasp on the range of human variety: “So many men, so many opinions” was an observation of his. And it’s in his comedy The Self-Tormentor that you’ll find what has proved something like the golden rule of cosmopolitanism: Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto. “I am human: nothing human is alien to me.” The context is illuminating. The play’s main character, a busybody farmer named Chremes, is told by his overworked neighbor to mind his own affairs; the homo sum credo is his breezy rejoinder. It isn’t meant to be an ordinance from on high; it’s just the case for gossip.

#### More explanation

Appiah 06

2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. (<http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev_4_08_Appiah_Review.pdf>) //QM

A tenable cosmopolitanism tempers a respect for difference with a respect for actual human beings—and with a sentiment best captured in the credo, once comic, now commonplace, penned by that former slave from North Africa. Few remember what Chremes says next, but it’s as important as the sentence everyone quotes: “Either I want to find out for myself or I want to advise you: think what you like. If you’re right, I’ll do what you do. If you’re wrong, I’ll set you straight.”

# Neg

## 1NC Shell

#### Codifying distinctions between national and foreign is the constitution of otherness – it’s what allows enemy creation //OR SPECIFIC LINK

**Neocleous, 8** - Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University(Mark, Critique of Security, p. 122

In other words, the ideology of (national) security served and continues to serve as a means of delineating, framing and asserting identity. Security functions as a means not just for identifying and dealing with potential military threats, but also as a mechanism for the political constitution and cultural production of identity and, as such, for the unity of political community. Thus the struggle for security against the enemy – be it the communist menace or global terrorism – becomes a reaffirmation of the historical burden of a distinctive identity around which the nation must unite. And yet we might equally say that the ideology of national identity serves to delineate, frame and assert national security: identity becomes a mechanism for the constitution of security. This is a double-edged process. On the one hand, it involves simultaneously distancing this identity from the Other, often through distinguishing the values central to this identity from the values of the enemy (or, more usually, the ‘lack’ of values of the enemy).60 In Michael Shapiro’s terms, as a key dimension of foreign policy, national security involves the making of the ‘foreign’ and the constitution of ‘Otherness’. The making of the Other as something foreign is not simply an exercise in differentiation, but is integrally linked to how the self is understood. A self constructed with a security-related identity leads to the constitution of Otherness in terms of the level of threat the Other is said to offer to that security.61 On the other hand, this reasserts and reinforces the acceptability of only certain forms of behaviour, modes of being, and political subjectivities. In so doing it steers us away from other alliances – those which might encourage us to contemplate a possible society not organised around security, private property and bourgeois order – and impresses on us the importance of loyalty.

#### By criticizing reliance on the idea of methodological nationalism we can open up space for cosmopolitanism

Delanty 06 (Gerard Delanty, Professor of Sociology in the University of Liverpool 2006, “The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory,” The British Journal of Sociology, Volume 57, Issue 1, <http://www.oneworlduv.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/cosmopolitan_imagination.pdf>] IQ

The micro dimension of cosmopolitanism concerns individual agency and social identities, that is aspects of cosmopolitanism reflected in internal societal change. This is the dimension of cosmopolitanism that is most commonly commented on, but the examples that are generally given tend to focus on trans-national or post-national phenomena. The conclusion of this paper is that this dimension must not only be looked at in the wider context of the macro and historical framework of modernity, but it must also be seen as more than a simple empirical condition, as in the frequently given example of a shift from national community to transnational community or the replacement of national identities by cosmopolitan ones. The micro dimension of cosmopolitanism is exemplified in changes within, for example, national identities rather than in the emergence in new identities. So cosmopolitanism is not to be equated with transnationalization, as is the tendency in political cosmopolitanism as discussed above. The relativizing of cultural values in contemporary society and the experience of contingency has led to a greater self-scrutiny within national identity: there are few national identities that do not contain self-problematizing forms of self-understanding. Rather than find cosmopolitanism embodied in a supra-national identity it makes more sense to see it expressed in more reflexive kinds of self-understanding. Taking the example of Europeanization, a cosmopolitan European identity can be seen less as a new supra identity rather than as a growing reflexivity within existing identities, including personal, national and supranational identities, as well as in other kinds of identities (see Delanty 2005). In addition to the transformation in identity, there is also the transformation in communication and in cultural models. The indicators of cosmopolitanism go beyond shifts in identity to wider discursive and cultural transformation. In methodological terms, cosmopolitan indicators are necessarily ones concerning socio-cultural mediation. If the cosmopolitan moment arises in the construction and emergence of new identities or forms of self-understanding, cultural frames and cultural models, then mediation is the key to it. This emphasis on mediation between, for example, competing conceptions of the social world accords with the cosmopolitan idea in all its forms: the desire to go beyond ethnocentricity and particularity. In this sense then critical cosmopolitanism is an open process by which the social world is made intelligible; it should be seen as the expression of new ideas, opening spaces of discourse, identifying possibilities for translation and the construction of the social world. Following Bryan Turner’s analysis, it can be related to such virtues as irony (emotional distance from one’s own history and culture), reflexivity (the recognition that all perspectives are culturally conditioned and contingent), scepticism towards the grand narratives of modern ideologies, care for other cultures and an acceptance of cultural hybridization, an ecumenical commitment to dialogue with other cultures, especially religious ones, and nomadism, as a condition of never being fully at home in cultural categories or geo-political boundaries (Turner 2001; Turner and Rojek 2001: 225). This is also reiterated in the arguments of other social theorists, such as Calhoun (2003), Gilroy (2004) and Kurasawa (2004) that cosmopolitanism does not entail the negation of solidarities, as liberal cosmopolitan theorists, such as Nussbaum (1996) argue, but is more situated and, as Appiah (2005) argues, it is also ‘rooted’. This notion of cosmopolitanism goes beyond conventional associations of cosmopolitanism with world polity or with global flows. The article stresses the socially situated nature of cosmopolitan processes while recognizing that these processes are world-constituting or constructivist ones. Such processes take the form of translations between things that are different. The space of cosmopolitanism is the space of such translations. While the capacity for translation has always existed, at least since the advent of writing, it is only with modernity that translation or translatability, has itself become the dominant cultural form for all societies. Translation once served the function of communication and was not the basis of a given culture. It is only becoming fully apparent today what the logic of translation has extended beyond the simple belief that everything can be translated to the recognition that every culture can translate itself and others. The most general one is the translation of inside/outside as a solution to the problem of inclusion and exclusion. Other dynamics of translation are those of the local and global, self and other, particular and universal, past and present, core and periphery. It is the nature of such translations that the very terms of the translation is altered in the process of translation and something new is created. This is because every translation is at the same time an evaluation. Without this dimension of self-transcendence, cosmopolitanism is a meaningless term. Conceived of in such terms, cosmopolitanism entails the opening up of normative questions within the cultural imaginaries of societies. The research object for critical cosmopolitan sociology concerns precisely this space, the discursive space of translations. Conclusion Cosmopolitanism does not refer simply to a global space or to post-national phenomena that have come into existence today as a result of globalization. The argument advanced in this paper is that it resides in social mechanisms and dynamics that can exist in any society at any time in history where world openness has a resonance. Clearly cosmopolitanism has become relevant today, due not least to the impact of globalization. Cosmopolitanism concerns processes of self-transformation in which new cultural forms take shape and where new spaces of discourse open up leading to a transformation in the social world. The cosmopolitan imagination from the perspective of a critical social theory of modernity tries to capture the transformative moment, interactive relations between societies and modernities, the developmental and dialogic. For these reasons, methodologically speaking, a critical cosmopolitan sociology proceeds on the assumption that culture contains capacities for learning and that societies have developmental possibilities. The article has highlighted translations as one of the central mechanisms of cosmopolitan transformation and which occurs on macro-societal and on micro dimensions as well as being played on in the continued transformation of modernities. Cosmopolitan sociology is a means of making sense of social transformation and therefore entails an unavoidable degree of moral and political evaluation. To this extent, cosmopolitanism is a connecting strand between sociology and political discourse in society and in political theory. It has a critical role to play in opening up discursive spaces of world openness and thus in resisting both globalization and nationalism.

#### Cosmopolitanism is a mind set that acknowledges borders as accidents of history that should be morally irrelevant, and thus priorities loyalty to all of humanity above loyalty to a portion of it, checking things like Nazi Germany.

Appiah 06

2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. <http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev_4_08_Appiah_Review.pdf> //QM

Yet the impartialist version of the cosmopolitan creed has continued to hold a steely fascination. Virginia Woolf once exhorted “freedom from unreal loyalties”—to nation, sex, school, neighborhood, and on and on. Leo Tolstoy, in the same spirit, inveighed against the “stupidity” of patriotism. “To destroy war, destroy patriotism,” he wrote in an 1896 essay—a couple of decades before the tsar was swept away by a revolution in the name of the international working class. Some contemporary philosophers have similarly urged that the boundaries of nations are morally irrelevant—accidents of history with no rightful claim on our conscience. But if there are friends of cosmopolitanism who make me nervous, I am happy to be opposed to cosmopolitanism’s noisiest foes. Both Hitler and Stalin—who agreed about little else, save that murder was the first instrument of politics—launched regular invectives against “rootless cosmopolitans” and while, for both, anti-cosmopolitanism was often just a euphemism for anti-Semitism, they were right to see cosmopolitanism as their enemy. For they both required a kind of loyalty to one portion of humanity—a nation, a class—that ruled out loyalty to all of humanity. And the one thought that cosmopolitans share is that no local loyalty can ever justify forgetting that each human being has responsibilities to every other. Fortunately, we need take sides neither with the nationalist who abandons all foreigners nor with the hard-core cosmopolitan who regards her friends and fellow citizens with icy impartiality. The position worth defending might be called (in both senses) a partial cosmopolitanism

#### National identity is invoked to prop up the national security state and is responsible for millions of deaths and widespread structural violence

**Neocleous, 8** - Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University(Mark, Critique of Security, p. 101-105)

Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104

‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991, ‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism flowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new ‘secure’ global liberal order.

The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock - well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this:

Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109

Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history.

All of this has been more than confirmed by events in the twentyfirst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it.

While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine.

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.110

In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justification for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’- type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

## Link

### Generic

#### Codifying distinctions between national and foreign is the constitution of otherness – it’s what allows enemy creation

**Neocleous, 8** - Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University(Mark, Critique of Security, p. 122

In other words, the ideology of (national) security served and continues to serve as a means of delineating, framing and asserting identity. Security functions as a means not just for identifying and dealing with potential military threats, but also as a mechanism for the political constitution and cultural production of identity and, as such, for the unity of political community. Thus the struggle for security against the enemy – be it the communist menace or global terrorism – becomes a reaffirmation of the historical burden of a distinctive identity around which the nation must unite. And yet we might equally say that the ideology of national identity serves to delineate, frame and assert national security: identity becomes a mechanism for the constitution of security. This is a double-edged process. On the one hand, it involves simultaneously distancing this identity from the Other, often through distinguishing the values central to this identity from the values of the enemy (or, more usually, the ‘lack’ of values of the enemy).60 In Michael Shapiro’s terms, as a key dimension of foreign policy, national security involves the making of the ‘foreign’ and the constitution of ‘Otherness’. The making of the Other as something foreign is not simply an exercise in differentiation, but is integrally linked to how the self is understood. A self constructed with a security-related identity leads to the constitution of Otherness in terms of the level of threat the Other is said to offer to that security.61 On the other hand, this reasserts and reinforces the acceptability of only certain forms of behaviour, modes of being, and political subjectivities. In so doing it steers us away from other alliances – those which might encourage us to contemplate a possible society not organised around security, private property and bourgeois order – and impresses on us the importance of loyalty.

### Link- Trade Leadership

#### The idea of Trade Leadership reinforces nationalistic mindsets and leads to mass protectionism

Lindsey 98 [Brink Lindsey, Senior fellow at the Cato Institute and the director of its Center for Trade Policy Studies, “Free Trade Nationalism” November 9, 1998, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/free-trade-nationalism>] IQ

Free trade is losing its grip on the conservative movement. In recent years a growing minority of conservatives, led by Patrick Buchanan, has swung to the opposite end of the spectrum and embraced outright protectionism. Less noticeably, others on the right who remain opposed to raising new trade barriers have grown disenchanted with trying to remove existing ones. The September 25 House vote on “fast track” trade negotiating authority tells the story. The GOP leadership pushed for a vote before the midterm elections, claiming that Republicans would carry the measure even in the face of overwhelming Democratic opposition. They didn’t even come close: the bill went down 243-180, with roughly a third of the Republican caucus voting against the party line. What’s happening here? Why are conservatives running away from a cause that promotes tax cuts and deregulation? One explanation is that conservatives are being asked to choose between their nationalism and their free-market economics. It’s a false dilemma: The conflict arises not from the nature of free trade, but from the way it has been packaged and pursued. For over six decades, trade liberalization has served as the handmaiden of an internationalist foreign policy. This association goes back to the New Deal, when, in the aftermath of the disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariff, FDR’s secretary of state Cordell Hull masterminded and pushed through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Previously, setting tariff levels had been a matter of domestic economic policy; now it became the subject of international negotiations. Hull and the other New Dealers who pulled off this transformation did so not out of love for free markets generally; their aims were primarily diplomatic. In the international arena, they saw open markets as a way of promoting peaceful relations in an increasingly hostile world. After World War II, free trade was integrated into the larger strategy of containing Soviet communism. By increasing our commercial ties with Europe and Japan, trade agreements fortified the solidarity of the Western alliance. And by opening our markets to Third World countries, we hoped to prevent defections to the Soviet camp. The Cold War is over, but U.S. support for trade liberalization continues to be sold as an obligation of American “international leadership.” Fast track in particular tends to get lumped together with calls for additional IMF funding and paying back UN dues, mixed in with grousing about know-nothing members of Congress who don’t even have passports. Protectionist countries have changed their policies in order to catch up economically with more open countries. It follows that the most important thing the United States can do to foster liberalization elsewhere is to set a good example. It’s not just that free traders have sold their cause on foreign policy grounds. Through linking trade liberalization exclusively with international negotiations, they have actually conveyed the impression that free trade requires the subordination of the U.S. national economic interest to broader concerns. After all, in trade talks countries agree to reduce their trade barriers only on the condition that other countries do likewise. Thus, trade barriers are treated like nuclear missiles in arms control talks — prized strategic assets that are given up only in exchange for foreign assets of equivalent value. (Indeed, in the parlance of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a commitment to reduce tariffs is a “concession.”) With the issue so framed, the military metaphors proliferate. Trade “hawks” argue that relatively open markets amount to “unilateral disarmament,” and urge that we close off access to U.S. markets unless foreign countries let in more American goods. Free traders, by resisting such calls, get cast as “doves.” Of course, the equation of trade with war is economic nonsense. Trade, unlike war, is not a zero sum game: one country doesn’t “win” at another’s expense. In particular, openness to foreign competition is not a vulnerability. On the contrary, it allows a country’s citizens to enjoy the best goods and services the world has to offer, and to specialize in those pursuits at which they are relatively more productive. And the benefits of open markets accrue regardless of whether other countries maintain similarly liberal policies. Nevertheless, free traders have seldom challenged the protectionist misconceptions that trade talks encourage. By and large they accept the notion that the United States is somehow at a disadvantage because most of our trading partners maintain higher trade barriers than we do. Their position is that America is strong enough to “win” at international trade even with the deck stacked against us; and anyway, they argue, broader geopolitical interests — countering Soviet power, and now maintaining some kind of nebulous “influence” — outweigh narrow commercial concerns. Thus, by the twisted logic of trade negotiations, free traders appear to be asking the United States to play by less favorable rules than apply to other countries. Furthermore, the direction of trade negotiations in recent years suggests a connection between free trade and the progressive diminution of U.S. national sovereignty. The scope of trade agreements has broadened far beyond simple tariff-cutting to encompass sweeping forays into traditional domestic policy areas. In particular, efforts to “harmonize” national policies on labor and the environment are working their way onto negotiating agendas at both the regional and multilateral levels. And to enforce these increasingly ambitious agreements, new and more powerful international institutions — most notably, the World Trade Organization — have been created and empowered to pronounce judgment on national laws’ fidelity to international obligations.

### Link- Climate Change

#### Attempts to solve for warming in the current political structure only recreate the idea of national interest. Cosmopolitanism is needed to solve for Warming.

Colic-Peisker 11 [Val Colic-Peisker, Associate Professor (sociology) in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, “How much cosmopolitanism there is in globalisation? The case of the global warming policy debate” 2011 <https://www.tasa.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/Colic-Perisker-R0092-Final.pdf>] I

The important issue here is that the widespread ‘global consciousness’ does not automatically represent a ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’. Global consciousness is impotent in creating a cosmopolitan world where ‘rational global citizens bound by ties of solidarity and mutual obligation’ (Alexander 2006) act together towards a common goal—for example, global preservation through policies that address global warming. It would be hard to dispute that the survival of the civilisation as we know it, and perhaps even the planet’s eco-system, is a worthwhile goal. However, in the ultra-competitive late-capitalist globalisation the idea of common good is a quaint and irrelevant thought, left on the margins to academics, political idealists and NGO activists (Etzioni 2004). In the case of global warming, the green parties are the only ones in the democratic political space arguing that preserving the global environment, even if against the dominant economic rationality, may be a common good. In the political and ideological space we inhabit, the only politically permissible way to express the idea of the common good is through the idea of national interest, not global interest— even if the latter is the condition of the former as in the case of global warming. The idea of national interest fits into the competitive economic paradigm: our national interest against other national interests. What results is a situation of permanent national mobilisation, caused by real or perceived economic and other ‘threats’ and ‘challenges’. For example, we are constantly told we have to be globally competitive. For the global common good to fit into this paradigm we would need a hostile planet competing with us for galactic predominance—something not likely to happen. The problem with 5 global environmental common good is that it has to be imagined, as well as worked towards, outside the dominant economic rationality. Ethical cosmopolitanism exists in the West but it is small and fragile. According to Robbins (1992), cosmopolitans are a thin layer of the privileged. Western middle classes may feel like ethical global citizens and members of the global civil society when they respond to global appeals, buy ‘fair-trade’ products or contribute to transnational charities: these may be forms of growing ‘everyday ethical cosmopolitanism’. Amidst the ideological ambivalence and controversy, it remains unclear who is ‘cosmopolitan’, how ‘cosmopolitanism’ should be practiced and what is its relationship to our narrower commitments; for example, how can it compete with the nation as a mode of belonging and solidarity (Cheah and Robbins 1998; Cheah 2006; Nussbaum 1996) in a practical policy sense? It is easy to agree with Hannerz (1996:82) who was ‘less than impressed with the depth and coherence of the transnational culture of the late 20th century’. We remain in our national trenches (sometimes with our allies), defending our national interests. While most people may have a vague feeling of belonging to ‘one world’, the idea of political community does not extend beyond national borders. At present, the West lives in fear of China and Islamic countries, for different reasons. The current global political setup is reminiscent of Orwell’s 1984 dystopian vision of three superpowers constantly at war with each other, just changing alliances. The idea of one world certainly stands in an environmental sense but it is challenged by economic competition and political realities of real or potential conflict. In such a context, the question is: how can ethical cosmopolitanism acquire enough political power to face the challenges of global warming? For cosmopolitanism to be a viable mode of solidarity and indeed a political force, it needs its avant-garde, its leadership and also its outlets. The internet may be the outlet. But who are the avant-garde cosmopolitans and who will lead them? A world government may be needed but this is an unrealistic prospect. The UN is the closest thing to a world government but it just reflects the power of its most powerful members—often at odds—and therefore inefficient in dealing with global problems. The quest for the world government remains utopian

#### Focus on Climate Change from the standpoint of nation states bolster nationalism. Only a Cosmopolitan mindset can solve.

Beck 7 [Ulrich Beck, Professor of sociology at Munich's Ludwig-Maximilian University and the London School of Economics, and author of *World at Risk* “In the new, anxious world, leaders must learn to think beyond borders” July 12, 2007 <https://debatecoaches.wikispaces.com/Negative+Kritiks+Chattahoochee+KL+(2012-2013)>] IQ

From supercasinos to the school curriculum, the central motif of Prime Minister Brown's first fortnight has been change, change, change. But for a progressive left-of-centre party at the dawn of the 21st century the most important change concerns the very mode of thinking: we have to free ourselves from the straitjacket of the nation-based approach. Like other progressive parties, what New Labour needs is a transnational, social and ecological agenda. The world faces a host of problems - from climate change, global economic interdependence and migratory movements through to issues of regional and global peacekeeping - and nation-based thinking has lost its political capacity to deal with any of them. Ironically enough, almost every issue that has fuelled nationalism in Europe - the transfer of jobs to other countries, refugee flows, wars, terrorism - is an international issue. The stories you need to read, in one handy email Read more Economic globalisation, climate change and the terrorist threat are reinforcing fears and inequalities the world over. People everywhere cry out for reassurance and a change in course. John Kenneth Galbraith was right when he wrote: "All the great leaders have had one characteristic in common: it was the willingness to confront unequivocally the major anxiety of their people in their time. This, and not much else, is the essence of leadership." Meeting the needs of the anxious people waking up in a new world - in the world risk society - is the great political challenge of our time. This is plain enough when it comes to the incalculable, unpredictable character of terrorism. But it is also true for the losers of globalisation and the costs of climate change. From the massive wave of renationalisation taking place in Russia to the success of the populists in Latin America and eastern Europe, untrammelled capitalism is generating fears and reactions the likes of which we have not seen since the fall of the Berlin wall. Resistance is growing as the middle sections of global society begin to realise that they gain no share in the benefits generated by the current period of economic growth - indeed, that their slice of the cake may even be getting smaller. Ordinary middle-class workers - whether they live in Manchester, the American midwest, the deindustrialised Ruhr area of Germany, Latin America or eastern Europe - find themselves left out. The phenomenon is similar wherever you look: the rates of growth of average family incomes are far lower than productivity growth rates, and have been so for years. Economic globalisation is giving rise to new forms of inequality which, increasingly, will have to be tackled transnationally. The emerging ecological revolution (and counter-revolution) also gives rise to new fears and social inequalities. How can the cost of combating climate change be distributed equitably in the face of cultural differences and social inequalities? There is a need for a new Nicholas Stern, capable of spelling out the key issue of justice for a new New Labour in both national and global terms and with equal concern for both economy and ecology. Like the Titanic, the climate catastrophe knows no democracy. The majority of the victims are trapped in the cheap lower decks, from which there is no escape. Those who are driving climate change are simultaneously attacking the poorest of the poor and threatening their own means of survival. Those who seek to protect their citizens and properties in Britain, the US and Japan from the flooding that will occur when rivers burst their banks and sea levels rise are falling prey to the illusion that the social and political consequences of climate change can be addressed by a solo effort. This is merely another way of dodging the key issue of global justice. And those who argue that "climate protection doesn't hurt" (to use the words of the German environment minister Sigmar Gabriel), that we can get climate change under control by using fuel-efficient engines and building clean power stations, are kidding themselves. Climate change is not solely a matter of hurricanes, droughts, floods, refugee movements, impending wars or unprecedented market failure. Suddenly, and for the first time in history, every population, culture, ethnic group, religion and region in the world faces a future that threatens one and all. In other words, if we want to survive, we have to include those who have been excluded. The politics of climate change is necessarily inclusive and global - it is cosmopolitics. The fact that the Earth's atmosphere is warming up is seen today as the biggest and most formidable economic and political challenge the world has ever faced. There is good reason for this, as it is not merely a matter of reducing emissions; it is a matter of sharing the economic growth so closely associated with carbon dioxide emissions between countries and their populations. The crucial question then is this: will the rich reduce their emissions so that the poor have enough room for growth? Climate change forces us to realise that the only way of setting up effective checks is through fairness and equality: only by taking account of others in our own decision-making can we ultimately protect ourselves effectively from the consequences of global warming. When taken seriously and thought through to its logical conclusions, climate change demands a political paradigm shift. Only a broad-based coalition that includes "old Europeans", eco-conscious Americans, underdeveloped countries, developing countries and civil society movements can succeed. It is not a matter of undermining, let alone abolishing nation-states. Rather, it is a matter of restoring to them the capacity to act effectively - together and in collaboration with one another.

### National identity / boarders

#### Codifying borders creates a shared sense of national identity – this ontology of sovereignty eliminates effective politics and conceals violence

**Shaw, 99** - Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria (Karena, “Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 569, lexis)

So, for example, over the past few centuries, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion expressed by sovereignty have been inscribed and reinforced through immigration policies, citizenship and voting policies, border patrols, nationalist struggles, the creation of new states, and the divisions of others. It would be difficult to assert that these patterns of inclusion and exclusion simply "made sense," given the violences that have been effected to maintain them. However, the structures and functioning of mechanisms of communication, transportation, war, economy, and so on, were such that sovereignty "worked" in some cases to the benefit of citizens within particular states, protecting them from the vagrancies of capitalism, environmental disaster, particular kinds of violences, some forms of discrimination and injustice. It has never "worked" as effectively for others, which is no accident, of course, given the particularity, the historical, social and cultural specificity, of the ontology of sovereignty. However, as technologies--particularly of capitalism, war, and communication--have changed, so have both the potential dangers to citizens and the ability of any given sovereign power to ameliorate them. Given this, it is important to pose the question of whether a territorially bounded, identity-grounded sovereignty is either possible or desirable. If it is not, the perpetuation of the mythology of sovereignty will provoke ever-increasing levels of violent resistance.

To pose this question is to open the problem of whether we should read the movements that Benhabib argues are struggles for identity as, rather, expressions of political conflicts that exceed the possibilities of an identity-based sovereignty to effectively address. What if, according to sovereignty discourse, the "non-politics" of what happens prior to relations of governance (the effects of the production of the ontological foundation that enables governance), is really where the action is these days? n41 What if, for example, instead of only or primarily reading contemporary movements as demands for "inclusion" at the level of relations of governance, we read them as resistances and challenges to the violences of sovereignty-constitution and subjectivity constitution? In other words, what if we read them not only as calls for more inclusive identities, but as effects of the violence produced by and thus as critiques of the identity/difference architecture for the basis of legitimate political authority?

It is crucial to recognize that if we assume sovereignty, these questions are foreclosed, rendered unrealistic, irresponsible. If we simply refuse to consider what sovereignty discourse effects (the distinctions between inside and outside, domestic and international, politics and war, legitimate and [\*586] illegitimate violence, citizens and foreigners, men and women, sane and mad, modern and primitive) and what it conceals (the traditions under which these distinctions are made) we thus contribute to a continuation of the mythology that these distinctions (and their constitutive violences) are beyond the political. We reinscribe them as necessary and natural, rather than as necessary and contingent and produced through violences that are both crippling and constitutive of personal and political possibility. What difference might it make to open these questions? Rather than exclusively focusing on making nicer identities, we could ask questions about the conditions--themselves highly political and often intolerable--under which we come to rely on identity as the basis for political authority, and the effects of this reliance. We could ask questions about whether we can reconstitute these conditions, about whether we can rearticulate the necessities and violences of political possibility.

#### Privacy focus is a link – it reduces opposing surveillance to an individual, rather than collective problem

**Martin, 98** – Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia (Brian, “Antisurveillance” Information Liberation, <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/98il/il04.html>

Note that I have couched this discussion in terms of surveillance and power rather than in terms of privacy and individual rights. Many of the writers in this area focus on privacy, assuming that there is a right to privacy and that violations of individual privacy must be weighed up against other competing values (such as increasing efficiency or stopping crime). This language of privacy and rights is typical of liberalism. It assumes that individuals are isolated entities who have agreed to participate in society according to a "contract."

There are a lot of problems with this picture. Individuals are not isolated and autonomous but are inevitably products of and participants in society. Furthermore, few individuals can be said to have genuinely agreed to their place in society -- as if there is any real alternative!

Another problem with the focus on privacy is that privacy means different things to different people and means different things in different cultures. (Even so, there may be commonalities in attitudes to privacy across the most divergent cultures.[4]) But people who have different concepts of privacy may agree to oppose particular types of surveillance.

A focus on privacy directs attention to the individual whose privacy is invaded; a focus on surveillance directs attention to the exercise of power and to the groups that undertake it. Whether antisurveillance is a better rallying point than privacy, though, remains to be seen.

#### Invoking national identity mobilizes loyalty to the state and creates a permanent state of emergency

**Neocleous, 8** - Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University(Mark, Critique of Security, p. 141)

Fascism aside, the attempt to secure the imagined community of the nation goes hand in hand with the politics of loyalty in reinforcing a system of symbolic representation of and concrete difference from the Other, the extensive policing of organisations and associations, and the political administration of human subjectivity. Thus alongside and as part of the national security state we find a security–identity–loyalty complex, held together by fear and violence. Deployed in the name of security, loyalty and identity help organise the political imagination around the state. Identity is mobilised for loyalty – to the state; loyalty is mobilised for identity – with the nation; and both loyalty and identity are thereby mobilised for security. It is as though identity could be borne only through the political cultivation of a devoted loyalty to the state and the ‘values’ it purports to defend, and only a permanently expressed loyalty to this identity will keep us secure.118 ‘Security’ is thus always much more than a dimension of foreign policy, military technology and external defence. Rather, it is integral to the logic of (national) identity, a key moment in the cultivation of loyalty within the garden of security. And the real beauty of this security–identity–loyalty complex is that permanent emergency and the collapse of any distinction between war and peace mean that the constant testing of loyalty, reassertion of identity and improvement in security can be carried out by and across the whole social body: the police are everywhere.

#### // RETAG To identify one set of abstract values as ‘right’ and the other as ‘wrong’ is extremely problematic.

Appiah 06

2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev\_4\_08\_Appiah\_Review.pdf //QM

I should be clear: this book is not a book about policy, nor is it a contribution to the debates about the true face of globalization. I’m a philosopher by trade, and philosophers rarely write really useful books. All the same, I hope to persuade you that there are interesting conceptual questions that lie beneath the facts of globalization. The cluster of questions I want to take up can seem pretty abstract. How real are values? What do we talk about when we talk about difference? Is any form of relativism right? When do morals and manners clash? Can culture be “owned”? What do we owe strangers by virtue of our shared humanity? But the way these questions play out in our lives isn’t so very abstract. By the end, I hope to have made it harder to think of the world as divided between the West and the Rest; between locals and moderns; between a bloodless ethic of profit and a bloody ethic of identity; “between “us” and “them.” The foreignness of foreigners, the strangeness of strangers: these things are real enough. It’s just that we’ve been encouraged, not least by well-meaning intellectuals, to exaggerate their significance by an order of magnitude. As I’ll be arguing, it is an error—to which we dwellers in a scientific age are peculiarly prone—to resist talk of “objective” values. In the absence of a natural science of right and wrong, someone whose model of knowledge is physics or biology will be inclined to conclude that values are not real; or, at any rate, not real like atoms and nebulae. In the face of this temptation, I want to hold on to at least one important aspect of the objectivity of values: that there are some values that are, and should be, universal, just as there are lots of values that are, and must be, local. We can’t hope to reach a final consensus on how to rank and order such values. That’s why the model I’ll be returning to is that of conversation—and, in particular, conversation between people from different ways of life. The world is getting more crowded: in the next half a century the population of our once foraging species will approach nine billion. Depending on the circumstances, conversations across boundaries can be delightful, or just vexing: what they mainly are, though, is inevitable.

#### It’s not objective – all truth claims are political, and theirs are supported by the ideology of sovereignty

**Shaw, 99** - Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria (Karena, “Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 569, lexis)

Again, however, the key question is why we should read these struggles one way rather than another. It is here that I think the most significant political stakes of contemporary theory reside. Crucially, this is not a question that can be answered by piling up empirical evidence, given that empirical evidence is always already framed by theoretical commitments. Nor is this to say that all readings are equally plausible. The question of how to read contemporary events and processes is essentially a political question. If we fail to open this question, a question that cannot be opened if we assume sovereignty, we will continue to impose sovereignty whether or not it is the appropriate response to contemporary circumstances. This, in turn, will leave us trapped within the mythology and logics of sovereignty, potentially facilitating further violences in its name.

### Link - constitutional patriotism

#### Applying universal moral principles to constitutional patriotism fails to avoid exclusion of non-citizens - it merely recreates a larger nation-state

Cohen, 99- Jean Louise Cohen is the Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Political Thought at Columbia University

(Jean, September 1999, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos”, International Sociology 14.3, 245-268)//Yak

Habermas acknowledges the discreteness of the political and the unavoidable 'ethical' dimension of any actual, institutionalized constitution (Habermas, 1993:1-19). Constitutional patriotism entails allegiance to 'our' particular constitution, not to any and every constitution. This entails attachment to the particular way in which a specific polity has institutionalized and interpreted abstract liberal and democratic principles, provided that these are open to reinterpretation. Accordingly, political identification with the specific constitution of a specific polity, and the political identity of the demos construed as those who so identify, is particular but not anti-universalist or illegitimately exclusionary.

With this synthesis of liberal and democratic principles of constitutionalism Habermas apparently avoids the illiberal thrust of citizenship construed as membership in a territorially based, culturally specific, national identity. The trick is accomplished by linking the three components of the citizenship principle in a specific way: the 'ethical' or particular constitutional ethos is seen as a specification of universal moral principles through democratic procedures and discussion on the part of a particular political community.

But there's the rub. The ethical component of constitutional patriotism cannot be reduced to a mere specification of universal moral principles (liberal or democratic). What makes a constitution American, German, French and so on, entails a lot more culture, tradition, habits of the heart, than this conception allows (McCarthy, 1991:181-99). The ethical-political or collective identity component cannot be reduced to a contextual application of universal moral principles of justice.

Moreover the problematic of the 'exclusiveness of the demos' is not resolved either on the national or supranational (regional) level so long as one assumes, as Habermas clearly does, that the various components of the citizenship principle will come together on the same institutional level. Habermas's constitutional patriotism remains within the modern paradigm of citizenship, even as he applies it to the supranational level of the European Union understood as a federal polity in the making (Habermas, 1996b). Europe, in this approach, once it has a democratically legitimate constitution and a European-wide societe politique (involving European political parties), would simply be a federalist mega-state with a new ethos forming around it. No other word would better capture the political identity that such a sovereign liberal democratic constitutional European federalist mega-state would foster, if successful, than nation. Constitutional patriotism even on this level would not avoid the paradoxical dialectic inherent in the modern paradigm of citizenship that drives republican or liberal democratic conceptions into the arms of thicker, more communitarian understandings of identity. It certainly does not exclude exclusion.

#### This is true even if they broaden what constitutes a US person

Cohen, 99- Jean Louise Cohen is the Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Political Thought at Columbia University

(Jean, September 1999, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos”, International Sociology 14.3, 245-268)//Yak

Until quite recently the dilemma was resolved everywhere in the same way: legal personhood was attached to citizenship status in a discrete state. Rights of non-citizens depended on the state's (as representative of the sovereign demos') will and on little else. Arendt and other democratic republican political theorists tried to reconcile the egalitarian universalistic principles they believed in with the discreteness and exclusionary logic of democratic citizenship in the modern paradigm in two ways: first, by applying universalism to the idea of citizenship as membership, such that citizenship itself becomes the core human right: everyone born into a territorial state has the right to citizenship within it and ought not to be deprived of it (Arendt, 1949). Second, democracy and the rule of law could be reconciled if, internally, the claim to unified sovereignty by the state (representing the demos) is resisted, disaggregated and controlled through a constitutionalism which establishes and limits powers by guaranteeing rights, by creating an overall separation and balance of powers, and by creating counter-powers through erecting a federalist structure. Constitutionalism of this sort would reconcile democratic self-rule of the demos, state power and the rule of law by denying the claim of absolute sovereignty (in the sense of legibus solutus) of 'the state' or any of its particular organs (Arendt, 1963; Arato, 1995: 202-4.)

There are several theoretical and normative inadequacies with this solution. I address three of them. First, the assumption that the 'exclusiveness of the demos' is simply a function of rules of access to citizenship that stress pre-political (ethno/cultural) instead of universalistic legal criteria is wrong. As I already indicated, if the democratic component of the citizenship principle is interpreted to entail self-rule by a self-determining demos (directly or through its representatives), and if this idea merges with the concept of the sovereign state that rules all the inhabitants of a territory, then such a polity will be a nation-state, and the demos will inevitably understand itself as a nation. Democratic citizenship in a state entails a distinction between members and non-citizens, and it inevitably becomes a pole of identity-formation and identification even in the most liberal democratic constitutionally articulated states. The very ambiguity of the term 'national' implies as much: it is used both as a synonym for a state's citizenry (to be a French national is to be a French citizen) and, at the very least, as a cultural category of collective identity. Even if citizenship laws are open and 'civic', even if civic patriotism is all that is legally required of new and old citizens, even if the identity of the nation is understood as an amalgam and open to constant reinterpretation, national citizenship tends to 'thicken' and to take on a cultural connotation and identity over time (Hollinger, 1995; Lind, 1995).

## Alt

### Alt- criticizing nationalism

#### By criticizing reliance on the idea of methodological nationalism we can open up space for cosmopolitanism

Delanty 06 (Gerard Delanty, Professor of Sociology in the University of Liverpool 2006, “The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory,” The British Journal of Sociology, Volume 57, Issue 1, <http://www.oneworlduv.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/cosmopolitan_imagination.pdf>] IQ

The micro dimension of cosmopolitanism concerns individual agency and social identities, that is aspects of cosmopolitanism reflected in internal societal change. This is the dimension of cosmopolitanism that is most commonly commented on, but the examples that are generally given tend to focus on trans-national or post-national phenomena. The conclusion of this paper is that this dimension must not only be looked at in the wider context of the macro and historical framework of modernity, but it must also be seen as more than a simple empirical condition, as in the frequently given example of a shift from national community to transnational community or the replacement of national identities by cosmopolitan ones. The micro dimension of cosmopolitanism is exemplified in changes within, for example, national identities rather than in the emergence in new identities. So cosmopolitanism is not to be equated with transnationalization, as is the tendency in political cosmopolitanism as discussed above. The relativizing of cultural values in contemporary society and the experience of contingency has led to a greater self-scrutiny within national identity: there are few national identities that do not contain self-problematizing forms of self-understanding. Rather than find cosmopolitanism embodied in a supra-national identity it makes more sense to see it expressed in more reflexive kinds of self-understanding. Taking the example of Europeanization, a cosmopolitan European identity can be seen less as a new supra identity rather than as a growing reflexivity within existing identities, including personal, national and supranational identities, as well as in other kinds of identities (see Delanty 2005). In addition to the transformation in identity, there is also the transformation in communication and in cultural models. The indicators of cosmopolitanism go beyond shifts in identity to wider discursive and cultural transformation. In methodological terms, cosmopolitan indicators are necessarily ones concerning socio-cultural mediation. If the cosmopolitan moment arises in the construction and emergence of new identities or forms of self-understanding, cultural frames and cultural models, then mediation is the key to it. This emphasis on mediation between, for example, competing conceptions of the social world accords with the cosmopolitan idea in all its forms: the desire to go beyond ethnocentricity and particularity. In this sense then critical cosmopolitanism is an open process by which the social world is made intelligible; it should be seen as the expression of new ideas, opening spaces of discourse, identifying possibilities for translation and the construction of the social world. Following Bryan Turner’s analysis, it can be related to such virtues as irony (emotional distance from one’s own history and culture), reflexivity (the recognition that all perspectives are culturally conditioned and contingent), scepticism towards the grand narratives of modern ideologies, care for other cultures and an acceptance of cultural hybridization, an ecumenical commitment to dialogue with other cultures, especially religious ones, and nomadism, as a condition of never being fully at home in cultural categories or geo-political boundaries (Turner 2001; Turner and Rojek 2001: 225). This is also reiterated in the arguments of other social theorists, such as Calhoun (2003), Gilroy (2004) and Kurasawa (2004) that cosmopolitanism does not entail the negation of solidarities, as liberal cosmopolitan theorists, such as Nussbaum (1996) argue, but is more situated and, as Appiah (2005) argues, it is also ‘rooted’. This notion of cosmopolitanism goes beyond conventional associations of cosmopolitanism with world polity or with global flows. The article stresses the socially situated nature of cosmopolitan processes while recognizing that these processes are world-constituting or constructivist ones. Such processes take the form of translations between things that are different. The space of cosmopolitanism is the space of such translations. While the capacity for translation has always existed, at least since the advent of writing, it is only with modernity that translation or translatability, has itself become the dominant cultural form for all societies. Translation once served the function of communication and was not the basis of a given culture. It is only becoming fully apparent today what the logic of translation has extended beyond the simple belief that everything can be translated to the recognition that every culture can translate itself and others. The most general one is the translation of inside/outside as a solution to the problem of inclusion and exclusion. Other dynamics of translation are those of the local and global, self and other, particular and universal, past and present, core and periphery. It is the nature of such translations that the very terms of the translation is altered in the process of translation and something new is created. This is because every translation is at the same time an evaluation. Without this dimension of self-transcendence, cosmopolitanism is a meaningless term. Conceived of in such terms, cosmopolitanism entails the opening up of normative questions within the cultural imaginaries of societies. The research object for critical cosmopolitan sociology concerns precisely this space, the discursive space of translations. Conclusion Cosmopolitanism does not refer simply to a global space or to post-national phenomena that have come into existence today as a result of globalization. The argument advanced in this paper is that it resides in social mechanisms and dynamics that can exist in any society at any time in history where world openness has a resonance. Clearly cosmopolitanism has become relevant today, due not least to the impact of globalization. Cosmopolitanism concerns processes of self-transformation in which new cultural forms take shape and where new spaces of discourse open up leading to a transformation in the social world. The cosmopolitan imagination from the perspective of a critical social theory of modernity tries to capture the transformative moment, interactive relations between societies and modernities, the developmental and dialogic. For these reasons, methodologically speaking, a critical cosmopolitan sociology proceeds on the assumption that culture contains capacities for learning and that societies have developmental possibilities. The article has highlighted translations as one of the central mechanisms of cosmopolitan transformation and which occurs on macro-societal and on micro dimensions as well as being played on in the continued transformation of modernities. Cosmopolitan sociology is a means of making sense of social transformation and therefore entails an unavoidable degree of moral and political evaluation. To this extent, cosmopolitanism is a connecting strand between sociology and political discourse in society and in political theory. It has a critical role to play in opening up discursive spaces of world openness and thus in resisting both globalization and nationalism.

### Alt- reject

#### Their 1ac scenarios are ideologically constructed to fit the interests of the security state – reject their claim to expertise

Rana 12- Ph.D. in political science at Harvard and a J.D. at Yale Law School

(Aziz Rana, July 2012, “Who Decides on Security?”, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417)//Yak

Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not selfevident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides—and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be—remains open as well.

Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers.312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments—assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view—such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy.

### Alt- Cosmo

#### Politically, Cosmopolitanism is Ready to Happen

Kleingeld and Brown 14’ (Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 2014, Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (1995) and the editor of Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace' and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (2006). She is also the Winner of the 2013 NAKS Biennial Book Prize. Eric Brown is an associate professor of philosophy as well as the director of graduate studies in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He got a Ph.D at University of Chicago and his research is mainly in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and ethics.  He is the author of Stoic Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge U.P., forthcoming) and essays on a wide range of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In addition to the essays listed below, he has recently contributed chapters to Blackwell's Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Companion to Socrates, and Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought; to The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism and The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought; and to The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (this is the updated version), Edward N. Zalta (editor), Cosmopolitanism, AA)

It is often argued that it is impossible to change the current system of states and to form a world-state or a global federation of states. This claim is hard to maintain, however, in the face of the existence of the United Nations, the existence of states with more than a billion people of heterogeneous backgrounds, and the experience with the United States and the European Union. So in order to be taken seriously, the objection must instead be that it is impossible to form a good state or federation of that magnitude, i.e., that it is impossible to realize or even approximate the cosmopolitan ideal in a way that makes it worth pursuing and that does not carry prohibitive risks. Here political cosmopolitans disagree among themselves. On one end of the spectrum we find those who argue in favor of a strong world-state, on the other end we find the defenders of a loose and voluntary federation, or a different system altogether. The defenders of the loose, voluntary and noncoercive federation warn that a world-state easily becomes despotic without there being any competing power left to break the hold of despotism (Rawls). Defenders of the world-state reply that a stronger form of federation, or even merger, is the only way to truly exit the state of nature between states, or the only way to bring about international distributive justice (Nielsen, Cabrera). Other authors have argued that the focus among many political cosmopolitans on only these two alternatives overlooks a third, and that a concern for human rights should lead one to focus instead on institutional reform that disperses sovereignty vertically, rather than concentrating it in all-encompassing international institutions. On this view, peace, democracy, prosperity, and the environment would be better served by a system in which the political allegiance and loyalties of persons are widely dispersed over a number of political units of various sizes, without any one unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of the state (Pogge). Of the objections brought up by non- or anti-cosmopolitans, two deserve special mention. First, some authors argue that the (partial or whole) surrender of state sovereignty required by the cosmopolitan scheme is an undue violation of the principle of the autonomy of states or the principle of democratic self-determination of their citizens. Second, so-called ‘realists’ argue that states are in a Hobbesian state of nature as far as the relations among them are concerned, and that it is as inappropriate as it is futile to subject states to normative constraints. To these objections cosmopolitans have various kinds of response, ranging from developing their alternative normative theory (e.g., by arguing that global democracy increases rather than diminishes the democratic control of individual world citizens) to pointing out, as has been done at least since Grotius, that states have good reasons even on Hobbesian grounds to submit to certain forms of international legal arrangements.

#### Cosmopolitanism

Delanty 06

Gerard Delanty “The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory” The British Journal of Sociology 2006 Volume 57 Issue 1. Professor of Sociology & Social & Political Thought (Sociology) University of Liverpool (http://www.oneworlduv.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/cosmopolitan\_imagination.pdf) //QM

Critical cosmopolitanism is an emerging direction in social theory and reflects both an object of study and a distinctive methodological approach to the social world. It differs from normative political and moral accounts of cosmopolitanism as world polity or universalistic culture in its conception of cosmopolitanism as socially situated and as part of the self-constituting nature of the social world itself. It is an approach that shifts the emphasis to internal developmental processes within the social world rather than seeing globalization as the primary mechanism. This signals a post-universalistic kind of cosmopolitanism, which is not merely a condition of diversity but is articulated in cultural models of world openness through which societies undergo transformation. The cosmopolitan imagination is articulated in framing processes and cultural models by which the social world is constituted; it is therefore not reducible to concrete identities, but should be understood as a form of cultural contestation in which the logic of translation plays a central role. The cosmopolitan imagination can arise in any kind of society and at any time but it is integral to modernity, in so far as this is a condition of selfproblematization, incompleteness and the awareness that certainty can never be established once and for all. As a methodologically grounded approach, critical cosmopolitan sociology has a very specific task: to discern or make sense of social transformation by identifying new or emergent social realities.

#### Cosmopolitanism is A Valid Thing to Talk About

Kleingeld and Brown 14’ (Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 2014, Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (1995) and the editor of Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace' and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (2006). She is also the Winner of the 2013 NAKS Biennial Book Prize. Eric Brown is an associate professor of philosophy as well as the director of graduate studies in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He got a Ph.D at University of Chicago and his research is mainly in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and ethics.  He is the author of Stoic Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge U.P., forthcoming) and essays on a wide range of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In addition to the essays listed below, he has recently contributed chapters to Blackwell's Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Companion to Socrates, and Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought; to The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism and The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought; and to The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (this is the updated version), Edward N. Zalta (editor), Cosmopolitanism, AA)

One of the most common objections to cosmopolitanism attacks a position that is in fact made of straw. Often it is said that cosmopolitanism is meaningless without the context of a world-state or that cosmopolitanism necessarily involves the commitment to a world state. These claims are historically uninformed, because cosmopolitanism as a concept arose in the first instance as a metaphor for a way of life and not in literal guise. Ever since, there have been cosmopolitans who do not touch on the issue of international political organization, and of those who do, very few defend the ideal of a world-state. Furthermore, even those cosmopolitans who do favor a world-state tend to support something more sophisticated that cannot be dismissed out of hand, such as a thin conception of world government with layered sovereignty. The more serious and philosophically interesting challenges to cosmopolitanism come in two main forms. The first calls into question the possibility of realizing the cosmopolitan ideal, while the second queries its desirability. We discuss these two challenges to the different forms of cosmopolitanism in turn.

#### People Can Healthily Be Citizens of the World

Kleingeld and Brown 14’ (Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 2014, Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (1995) and the editor of Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace' and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (2006). She is also the Winner of the 2013 NAKS Biennial Book Prize. Eric Brown is an associate professor of philosophy as well as the director of graduate studies in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He got a Ph.D at University of Chicago and his research is mainly in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and ethics.  He is the author of Stoic Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge U.P., forthcoming) and essays on a wide range of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In addition to the essays listed below, he has recently contributed chapters to Blackwell's Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Companion to Socrates, and Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought; to The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism and The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought; and to The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (this is the updated version), Edward N. Zalta (editor), Cosmopolitanism, AA)

Another version of the criticism that cosmopolitanism is impossible targets the psychological assumptions of moral cosmopolitanism. Here it is said that human beings must have stronger attachments toward members of their own state or nation, and that attempts to disperse attachments to fellow-citizens in order to honor a moral community with human beings as such will undermine our psychological functioning. If this is a viability claim and not simply a desirability claim, then it must be supposed that moral cosmopolitanism would literally leave large numbers of people unable to function. So it is claimed that people need a particular sense of national identity in order to be agents, and that a particular sense of national identity requires attachment to particular others perceived to have a similar identity. But this does not seem to be true as an empirical generalization. The cosmopolitan does not need to deny that some people do happen to have the need for national allegiance, so long as it is true that not all people do; and insofar as some people do, the strict cosmopolitan will say that perhaps it does not need to be that way and that cosmopolitan education might lead to a different result. The historical record gives even the strict cosmopolitan some cause for cheer, as human psychology and the forms of political organization have proven to be quite plastic. In fact, some cosmopolitans have adopted a developmental psychology according to which patriotism is a step on the way to cosmopolitanism: as human individuals mature they develop ever wider loyalties and allegiances, starting with attachments to their caregivers and ending with allegiance to humanity at large. These different attachments are not necessarily in competition with each other. Just as loyalty to one's family need not be an obstacle for state citizens, so loyalty to one's state need not be a problem for cosmopolitans. Thus, cosmopolitanism is regarded as an extension of a developmental process that also includes the development of patriotism. This claim is just as much in need of empirical support, however, as the opposite claim discussed in the previous paragraph. Often, though, the critic's arguments about psychological possibility are actually run together with desirability claims. The critic says that the elimination of a special motivating attachment to fellow-citizens is not possible, but the critic means that the elimination of special motivating attachments to fellow-citizens will make a certain desirable form of political life impossible. To respond to this sort of argument, the cosmopolitan has two routes open. First, she can deny the claim itself. Perhaps the viability of politics as usual depends not upon certain beliefs that fellow-citizens deserve more of one's service, but upon commitments to the polity itself. If strictly cosmopolitan patriotism is a possibility, it lives in a commitment to a universal set of principles embodied in a particular political constitution and a particular set of political institutions. If such commitment is enough for desirable politics, then the anti-cosmopolitan is disarmed. But second, the cosmopolitan can of course also deny the value of the form of political life that is posited as desirable. At this point, moral commitments run over into a discussion of political theory.

#### Strict Cosmopolitanism Produces Good Citizens

Kleingeld and Brown 14’ (Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 2014, Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (1995) and the editor of Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace' and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (2006). She is also the Winner of the 2013 NAKS Biennial Book Prize. Eric Brown is an associate professor of philosophy as well as the director of graduate studies in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He got a Ph.D at University of Chicago and his research is mainly in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and ethics.  He is the author of Stoic Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge U.P., forthcoming) and essays on a wide range of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In addition to the essays listed below, he has recently contributed chapters to Blackwell's Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Companion to Socrates, and Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought; to The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism and The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought; and to The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (this is the updated version), Edward N. Zalta (editor), Cosmopolitanism, AA)

Occasionally it is said that cosmopolitans are treasonous or at least unreliable citizens. But many recognizably cosmopolitan theses (that is, the moderate ones) are consistent with loyalty to fellow-citizens, and even the strictest cosmopolitan can justify some forms of service to fellow-citizens when they are an optimal way to promote justice or to do good for human beings (who might happen to be fellow-citizens).This last criticism can be developed further, however, and tailored specifically to target the strict cosmopolitan. If the strict cosmopolitan can justify only some forms of service to fellow-citizens, under some conditions, it might be said that she is blind to other morally required forms or conditions of service to fellow-citizens. At this point, the critic offers reasons why a person has special obligations to compatriots, which are missed by the strict cosmopolitan. Many critics who introduce these reasons are themselves moderate cosmopolitans, wishing to demonstrate that there are special obligations to fellow-citizens in addition to general duties to the community of all human beings. But if these reasons are demanding enough, then there may be no room left for any community with all human beings, and so these objections to strict cosmopolitanism can also provide some impetus toward an anti-cosmopolitan stance. Because there are several such reasons that are frequently proposed, there are, in effect, several objections to the strictly cosmopolitan position, and they should be considered one-by-one. The first narrow objection to strict cosmopolitanism is that it neglects the obligations of reciprocity. According to this argument, we have obligations to give benefits in return for benefits received, and we receive benefits from our fellow-citizens. The best strictly cosmopolitan response to this argument will insist on a distinction between the state and fellow-citizens and will question exactly who provides which benefits and what is owed in return. On grounds of reciprocity the state may be owed certain things — cooperative obedience — and these things may in fact generally benefit fellow-citizens. But the state is not owed these things because one owes the fellow-citizens benefits. One does not appropriately signal gratitude for benefits received from the state by, say, giving more to local charities than to charities abroad because charity like this does not address the full agent responsible for the benefits one has received, and does not even seem to be the sort of thing that is commensurate with the benefits received. In assessing this exchange of arguments, there are some significantly difficult questions to answer concerning exactly how the receipt of benefits obliges one to make a return. A second objection to strict moral cosmopolitanism gives contractarian grounds for our obligations to fellow-citizens. Because actual agreements to prioritize fellow-citizens as beneficiaries are difficult to find, the contractarians generally rely upon an implicit agreement that expresses the interests or values of the fellow-citizens themselves. So the contractarian argument turns on identifying interests or values that obligate fellow-citizens to benefit each other. Perhaps, then, it will be argued that citizens have deep interests in what a successful civil society and state can offer them, and that these interests commit the citizens to an implicit agreement to benefit fellow-citizens. The strict cosmopolitan will reply to such an argument with skepticism about what is required for the civil society. Why is more than cooperative obedience required by our interests in what a successful state and civil society can provide? Surely some citizens have to dedicate themselves to working on behalf of this particular society, but why can they not do so on the grounds that this is the best way to benefit human beings as such? Perhaps an intermediate position here is the (Kantian) view that it is morally necessary to establish just democratic states and that just democratic states need some special commitment on the part of their citizens in order to function as democracies, a special commitment that goes beyond mere cooperative obedience but that can still be defended in universalist cosmopolitan terms. For given that democracies require this special commitment as a condition of their possibility, it would be incoherent to promote justice in general by promoting just democracies while rejecting, as a matter of principle, that which is required for just democracies to function. The final argument for recognizing obligations to benefit fellow-citizens appeals to what David Miller has called ‘relational facts.’ Here the general thought is that certain relationships are constituted by reciprocal obligations: one cannot be a friend or a brother without having certain friendship-obligations or sibling-obligations, respectively. If fellow-citizenship is like these other relations, then we would seem to have special obligations to fellow-citizens. But this argument, which can be found in Cicero's *De Officiis*, depends upon our intuitions that fellow-citizenship is like friendship or brotherhood and that friendship and brotherhood do come with special obligations, and both intuitions require more argument. Frequently, these arguments appeal to alleged facts about human nature or about human psychology, but these appeals generally raise still further questions.

#### Cosmopolitanism is Important and Needs to Be Talked About

Kleingeld and Brown 14’ (Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 2014, Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (1995) and the editor of Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace' and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (2006). She is also the Winner of the 2013 NAKS Biennial Book Prize. Eric Brown is an associate professor of philosophy as well as the director of graduate studies in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He got a Ph.D at University of Chicago and his research is mainly in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and ethics.  He is the author of Stoic Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge U.P., forthcoming) and essays on a wide range of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In addition to the essays listed below, he has recently contributed chapters to Blackwell's Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Companion to Socrates, and Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought; to The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism and The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought; and to The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (this is the updated version), Edward N. Zalta (editor), Cosmopolitanism, AA)

In sum, a range of interesting and difficult philosophical issues is raised by the disputes between cosmopolitans of various stripes and their critics. As the world becomes a smaller place through increased social, political, and economic contacts, these disputes and the issues they raise will only become more pressing.

## Impact

### Conflict/Dehue

#### Reinforcing national borders prevents addressing global existential threats – a counter-politics of security oriented towards cosmopolitanism must be the starting point of debate

**Graham, 12** - Ph.D. in Science and Technology Policy (Stephen, “Digital Medieval”, 27 March 2012, Surveillance & Society, 9(3), 321-327.)//gg

A final, crucial question emerges here. Above all these concerns, caveats, and crises we must consider how a successful counter-politics of security might be mobilized, which resists and recasts the violent shift towards a biopolitics of preemption, exception and managing the consequences of extreme polarization. Such a counterpolitics must seek to challenge not only the mythologies sustaining ubiquitous bordering. It must also confront the transnational complexes that feed off the way the extending and all-pervasive mantra of militarized ‘security’ now works to permeate every crevice of everyday urban life (Parr 2006).

In the current context it is profoundly subversive to ask the simple question: What might a politics of security be that actually addresses the real risks and threats that humankind faces in a rapidly urbanizing world prone to resource exhaustion, spiraling food, energy and water insecurity, biodiversity collapse, hyper-automobilisation, financial crises, and global warming and does this from a cosmopolitan rather than xenophobic and militaristic starting point? Or where it is the human, urban or ecological aspects of security that are foregrounded, rather than tawdry machinations and imagineering which surrounds constellations of states and transnational corporations, integrated through the dubious and corrupt relationships with burgeoning security-industrial-military complexes?

Such a process must clearly begin by contesting the increasingly widespread mobilisation of ‘hard’ – i.e. profitable – borders and security strategies to question whether these actually do anything but exacerbate vicious circles of fear and isolation, and quests for the holy grail of certainty, through technological omniscience combined with architectures of withdrawal for the wealthy, mobile, or powerful. “The growth of enclave societies,” Bryan Turner (2007) writes, “makes the search for cosmopolitan values and institutions a pressing need, but the current trend towards the erection of walls against the dispossessed and the underclass appears to be inexorable” (301).

Such cosmopolitan notions of urban, human and ecological security must be open to – indeed forged through – difference. They must work against the habitual translation of difference into objectification, Otherness and violence. They must assert the reinstatement of rights within states of reception as means to overcome the murderous sovereignties which surround the states of exception which increasingly characterize neoliberal capitalism. Finally, such a counter-politics must reject and reverse tendencies toward the ubiquitous bordering of mobility, circulation and social life based on ideas of ubiquitous bordering deployed both within and without the territorial limits of ‘homeland’ states.

A useful starting point here is provided by the work of philosopher, Adrian Parr. He urges that a viable counter politics to the ubiquitous border must start by opening up the “parameters of this debate in a way that no longer understands the outside as terrifying and a source of contamination, against which the inside defensively freezes itself in an effort to contain and ward-off encroachment” (2006: 106).

#### National identity prevents an effective response to global problems --- only articulating a shared identity can prevent extinction.

Smith, 3 - Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard University. (Rogers, Stories Of Peoplehood, The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, p. 166-169)

It is certainly important to oppose such evolutionary doctrines by all intellectually credible means. But many have already been widely discred­ited; and today it may well prove salutary, even indispensable, to heighten awareness of human identity as shared membership in a species engaged in an ages-long process of adapting to often dangerous and unforgiving natural and man-made environments.20 When we see ourselves in the light of general evolutionary patterns, we become aware that it is gen­uinely possible for a species such as ourselves to suffer massive setbacks or even to become extinct if we pursue certain dangerous courses of ac­tion. That outcome does not seem to be in any human's interest. And when we reflect on the state of our species today, we see or should see at least five major challenges to our collective survival, much less our col­lective nourishing, that are in some respects truly unprecedented. These are all challenges of our own making, however, and so they can all be met through suitably cooperative human efforts. The first is our ongoing vulnerability to the extraordinary weapons of mass destruction that we have been building during the last half century. The tense anticipations of imminent conflagration that characterized the Cold War at its worst are now behind us, but the nuclear arsenals that were so threatening are largely still with us, and indeed the governments and, perhaps, terrorist groups possessed of some nuclear weaponry have continued to proliferate. The second great threat is some sort of environmental disaster, brought on by the by-products of our efforts to achieve ever-accelerating industrial and post-industrial production and distribution of an incredible range of good and services. Whether it is global warming, the spread of toxic wastes, biospheric disruptions due to new agricultural techniques, or some combination of these and other consequences of human interfer­ence with the air, water, climate, and plant and animal species that sustain us, any major environmental disaster can affect all of humanity. Third, as our economic and technological systems have become ever more interconnected, the danger that major economic or technological failures in one part of the world might trigger global catastrophes may well increase. Such interdependencies can, to be sure, be a source of strength as well as weakness, as American and European responses to the East Asian and Mexican economic crises of the 1990s indicated. Still, if global capitalism were to collapse or a technological disaster comparable to the imagined Y2K doomsday scenario were to occur, the consequences today would be more far-reaching than they would have been for comparable developments in previous centuries. Fourth, as advances in food production, medical care, and other tech­nologies have contributed to higher infant survival rates and longer lives, the world's population has been rapidly increasing, placing intensifying pressures on our physical and social environments in a great variety of ways. These demographic trends, necessarily involving all of humanity, threaten to exacerbate all the preceding problems, generating political and military conflicts, spawning chronic and acute environmental damages, and straining the capacities of economic systems. The final major challenge we face as a species is a more novel one, and it is one that may bring consciousness of our shared "species in­terests" even more to the fore. In the upcoming century, human be­ings will increasingly be able to affect their own genetic endowment, in ways that might potentially alter the very sort of organic species that we are. Here as with modern weapons, economic processes, and pop­ulation growth, we face risks that our efforts to improve our condition may go disastrously wrong, potentially endangering the entire human race. Yet the appeal of endowing our children with greater gifts is suffi­ciently powerful that organized efforts to create such genetic technologies capable of "redesigning humans" are already burgeoning, both among reputable academic researchers and less restrained, but well-endowed, fringe groups.21 To be sure, an awareness of these as well as other potential dangers affecting all human beings is not enough by itself to foster moral outlooks that reject narrow and invidious particularistic conceptions of human identity. It is perfectly possible for leaders to feel that to save the species, policies that run roughshod over the claims of their rivals are not simply justified but morally demanded. Indeed, like the writers I have exam­ined here, my own more egalitarian and cosmopolitan moral leanings probably stem originally from religious and Kantian philosophical influ­ences, not from any consciousness of the common "species interests" of human beings. But the ethically constitutive story which contends that we have such interests, and that we can see them as moral interests, seems quite realistic, which is of some advantage in any such account. And under the circumstances just sketched, it is likely that more and more people will become persuaded that today, those shared species in­terests face more profound challenges than they have in most of human history. If so, then stressing our shared identity as members of an evolving species may serve as a highly credible ethically constitutive story that can challenge particularistic accounts and foster support for novel political arrangements. Many more people may come to feel that it is no longer safe to conduct their political lives absorbed in their traditional communi­ties, with disregard for outsiders, without active concern about the issues that affect the whole species and without practical collaborative efforts to confront those issues. That consciousness of shared interests has the potential to promote stronger and much more inclusive senses of trust, as people come to realize that the dangers and challenges they face in com­mon matter more than the differences that will doubtless persist. I think this sort of awareness of a shared "species interests" also can support senses of personal and collective worth, though I acknowledge that this is not obviously the case. Many people find the spectacle of the human species struggling for survival amidst rival life forms and an unfeeling material world a bleak and dispiriting one. Many may still feel the need to combine acceptance of an evolutionary constitutive story with reli­gious or philosophical accounts that supply some stronger sense of moral purpose to human and cosmic existence. But if people are so inclined, then nothing I am advocating here stands in the way of such combinations. Many persons, moreover, may well find a sustaining sense of moral worth in a conception of themselves as con­tributors to a species that has developed unique capacities to deliberate and to act responsibly in regard to questions no other known species can yet conceive: how should we live? What relationships should we have, individually and collectively, to other people, other life forms, and the broader universe? In time, I hope that many more people may come to agree that humanity has shared responsibilities of stewardship for the animate and physical worlds around us as well as ourselves, ultimately seeking to promote the flourishing of all insofar as we are capable and the finitude of existence permits. But even short of such a grand sense of species vocation, the idea that we are part of humanity's endeavor to strive and thrive across ever-greater expanses of space and time may be one that can inspire a deep sense of worth in many if not most human beings. Hence it does not seem unrealistic to hope that we can encourage in­creased acceptance of a universalistic sense of human peoplehood that may help rein in popular impulses to get swept up in more parochial tales of their identities and interests. In the years ahead, this ethical sen­sibility might foster acceptance of various sorts of transnational political arrangements to deal with problems like exploitative and wildly fluctuat­ing international financial and labor markets, destructive environmental and agricultural practices, population control, and the momentous issue of human genetic modifications. These are, after all, problems that appear to need to be dealt with on a near-global scale if they are to be dealt with satisfactorily. Greater acceptance of such arrangements would necessar­ily entail increased willingness to view existing governments at all levels as at best only "semi-sovereign," authoritative over some issues and not others, in the manner that acceptance of multiple particularistic constitu­tive stories would also reinforce. In the resulting political climate, it might become easier to construct the sorts of systems of interwoven democratic international, regional, state and local governments that theorists of "cos­mopolitan democracy," "liberal multicultural nationalism," and "differ­entiated democracy" like David Held, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young, William Connolly, and Jurgen Habermas all envision.

#### National identity is invoked to prop up the national security state and is responsible for millions of deaths and widespread structural violence

**Neocleous, 8** - Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University(Mark, Critique of Security, p. 101-105)

Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104

‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991, ‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism flowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new ‘secure’ global liberal order.

The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock - well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this:

Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109

Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history.

All of this has been more than confirmed by events in the twentyfirst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it.

While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine.

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.110

In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justification for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’- type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

#### Cosmopolitanism is a mind set that acknowledges borders as accidents of history that should be morally irrelevant, and thus priorities loyalty to all of humanity above loyalty to a portion of it, checking things like Nazi Germany.

Appiah 06

2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. <http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev_4_08_Appiah_Review.pdf> //QM

Yet the impartialist version of the cosmopolitan creed has continued to hold a steely fascination. Virginia Woolf once exhorted “freedom from unreal loyalties”—to nation, sex, school, neighborhood, and on and on. Leo Tolstoy, in the same spirit, inveighed against the “stupidity” of patriotism. “To destroy war, destroy patriotism,” he wrote in an 1896 essay—a couple of decades before the tsar was swept away by a revolution in the name of the international working class. Some contemporary philosophers have similarly urged that the boundaries of nations are morally irrelevant—accidents of history with no rightful claim on our conscience. But if there are friends of cosmopolitanism who make me nervous, I am happy to be opposed to cosmopolitanism’s noisiest foes. Both Hitler and Stalin—who agreed about little else, save that murder was the first instrument of politics—launched regular invectives against “rootless cosmopolitans” and while, for both, anti-cosmopolitanism was often just a euphemism for anti-Semitism, they were right to see cosmopolitanism as their enemy. For they both required a kind of loyalty to one portion of humanity—a nation, a class—that ruled out loyalty to all of humanity. And the one thought that cosmopolitans share is that no local loyalty can ever justify forgetting that each human being has responsibilities to every other. Fortunately, we need take sides neither with the nationalist who abandons all foreigners nor with the hard-core cosmopolitan who regards her friends and fellow citizens with icy impartiality. The position worth defending might be called (in both senses) a partial cosmopolitanism.

#### The concept of a citizenship-based rights produces exclusion by deeming non-members second class citizens

Cohen, 99- Jean Louise Cohen is the Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Political Thought at Columbia University

(Jean, September 1999, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos”, International Sociology 14.3, 245-268)//Yak

It is this paradigmatic conception of citizenship that has lost its power to convince today. But it always had a disturbing ambiguity that has now become apparent: are the uniform equal rights and respect owed to every citizen due to their individual status as legal persons or to their membership status as belonging to a particular political community? To put this differently, is the legal recognition of the rights-bearing individual presumptively granted to all human beings on this model or only to the citizens of a particular state? Marshall's happy consciousness regarding citizenship as a principle of inclusion and equality and his assumption that the components of the citizenship principle come together in a frictionless way paper over this ambiguity. In fact, he never confronted it because he simply assumed, like so many others, that the identity component of the citizenship principle into which he hoped to integrate the working class through social rights was a given: the cultural identity of the demos construed as a nation.

If we shift perspective away from the substantive rights of citizenship (Marshall's focus) to the formal dimension of membership things look rather different. The background presupposition of the modern paradigm of citizenship is that citizenship involves membership in a sovereign, territorial nation-state within a system of states. The nation-state is not only a territorial organization monopolizing legitimate rule within a bounded space, it is also, as Brubaker rightly argues, a membership organization (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship in such a state is an instrument of social closure. It always has an ascriptive dimension and it always establishes privilege insofar as it endows members with particular rights denied to non-members (today, primarily, the resident alien or foreigner). Thus, in the modern system of states, the republican ideal of the self-determining demos merges with the sovereign state's interest in control over all those in the territory through the construction of national citizenship as a formal category of membership. Exclusion and inequality, not inclusion, thus attach to citizenship seen as a membership principle (Brubaker, 1992).

To be sure, certain republican political theorists noted long ago the tendency of the nation-state to violate the egalitarian logic of constitutional democracy by fostering inequality and exclusion vis-a-vis national minorities and aliens. Hannah Arendt (1973) argued that this danger is intrinsic to the nation-state system. Because the nation-state equates the citizen with the member of the nation it collapses a political/legal category into a category of identity and perverts the egalitarian logic of the constitutional state by rendering those who are not members of the nation implicitly into second-class citizens. On the republican account, the problem lies in the reduction of the political principle of citizenship to a substantive exclusionary conception of collective identity: nationality. Accordingly Arendt argued for disaggregating citizenship from ascriptive criteria of national belonging (ethnic or cultural) and insisted that civil and political rights of citizens should not be allocated on the pre-political basis of nationality. States should not be nation-states but civic polities that grant citizenship on legal criteria (Arendt, 1973).

#### Specifically, the blossoming Chinese version of Cosmopolitanism is key for human rights and pacifism.

Chun 09

December 2009 “On Chinese Cosmopolitanism (Tian Xia)” by Shan Chun. Dr Shan Chun is Prof. At the Law School of The China University of Politics and Law, was Exchange Prof. at Alvernia University, USA (in 2001) and Bochum Fellow at Bochum University, Germany (in 2008). (http://www.international-relations.com/CM8-2/Chinese-Cosmopolitanism.pdf) //QM

The transformation of Chinese cosmopolitanism (tian xia) from the meaning of geographic space in the time of “Five Emperors (wu di) and Three Dynasties (san dai )” to the universal ethics based on human-heartedness (ren ) in the time of the Qin and Han witnesses a critical change in the making of the Chinese people. The importance of Chinese cosmopolitanism is seen in its role in the preservation of a unified Chinese territory and in the integration of the Chinese people. Chinese cosmopolitanism also gave rise to an ethical liberalism of the Chinese style, sustaining Chinese people in their social lives and cultivating their individual achievements. Chinese cosmopolitanism does not only reflect the geographical and ethical experiences of Chinese people that originated in their “Families (jia)” at the stage of patriarchal society, but also symbolizes the Chinese people in their acknowledging of the wider “geographic world” and developing universal values over more than two-thousand years. During the current age of globalization we should aim at mutual communication and benefit between human-heartedness (ren) combined with rites (li, or proper conduct), as exhibited in Chinese cosmopolitanism, and universal human rights as exhibited in world pacifism.

#### The alternative is to align with a transnational cosmopolitan humanism – the perceived risk to digital freedom mobilizes transnational resistance

**Beck, 13** - Ulrich Beck is Professor of Sociology at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany (“The digital freedom risk: too fragile an acknowledgment” Open Democracy, 8/30,

https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ulrich-beck/digital-freedom-risk-too-fragile-acknowledgment

The Prism scandal has opened up a new chapter in the world risk society. In the past decades we have encountered a series of global public risks, including the risks posed by climate change, nuclear energy, finances, September 11 and terrorism – and now the global digital freedom risk.

All these global risks (with the exception of terrorism) are more or less part of technological development, as well as of the misgivings usually expressed in the phases of modernization of any respective new technology. And now we have Edward Snowden’s disclosures. All of a sudden, something is happening that turns the global risk – in this case the digital freedom risk – into a globally public problem. However, the risk logic at work here is different from what we have known so far.

Whereas the accidents in the reactors of Chernobyl and later on Fukushima triggered a public debate about the nuclear power risk, the discussion about the digital freedom risk was not triggered by a catastrophe, because the real catastrophe would actually be an imposed hegemonic control on a global scale. The self-image of the information hegemony imposed, however, does not allow for this global risk.

In other words: this particular catastrophe would normally happen without anyone noticing. We have become aware of the potential catastrophe only because a single secret service expert from the United States applied the means of information control in order to tell the world about the global risk, and we are faced with a complete inversion of the normal situation.

Our awareness of this global risk is, at the same time, an extremely fragile one, because, unlike the other global risks, the risk we are dealing with does not focus on, result from or repeatedly refer to a catastrophe which is physical and real in space and time. It rather – and unexpectedly – interferes with something we have taken for granted, i.e. our capacity to control information, which has almost become our second nature. But then, the mere visibility of the matter triggers resistance.

Let us try and explain the phenomenon in a different way: first of all there are some features all global risks seem to share. In one way or another they all bring home to us the global interconnectedness in our everyday lives. These risks are all global in a particular sense, i.e. we are not dealing with spatially, temporally or socially restricted accidents, but with spatially, temporally and socially delimited catastrophes. And they are all collateral effects of a successful modernization, which questions retrospectively the institutions that have pushed modernization so far. In terms of the freedom risk, this includes: scenarios in which the capacity of the nation state to exercise democratic control fails and other cases in which the calculation of probabilities, or insurance protection, etc. do so too.

Furthermore, all these global risks are perceived differently in the different parts of the world. We are faced with a “clash of risk cultures”, in order to offer a variation of Huntington’s concept. We are also faced with an inflation of existential catastrophes, and with one catastrophe threatening to outdo the other: the financial risk “beats” the climate risk; and terrorism “beats” the violation of digital freedom. This is, by the way, one of the main barriers to any public recognition of the global risk to freedom, which, therefore, has not yet become the subject matter for public intervention.

The latter is, clearly, changing today. Yet, the acknowledgement of this fact is a rather fragile one. Who could the powerful player be, with an interest in keeping this risk alive in public awareness and thus pushing the public towards political action? The first candidate to come to my mind would be the democratic state. Alas, this would be like asking the fox to look after the chickens. Because it is the state itself, in collaboration with the digital trusts, that has established its hegemony in order to optimize its key interest in national and international security. Any movement here could, however, constitute a historic step away from the pluralism of nation states towards a digital global state, which is free from control.

The citizen is the second potential player on our list. However, the users of the new digital information media have, actually, become cyborgs. They employ these media as if they were senses, and consider them an integral part of their concept of how they understand and act in the world. The members of the Facebook generation, because of their dependence on social media, are on living within these media, in doing so, relinquish a relevant part of their individual freedom and privacy.

Who, then, could exercise this kind of control? It could be, for example, the Basic Law. Alas in Germany, Article 10 stipulates that postal and telecommunication secrecy is sacrosanct. That sounds like a phrase from a world long gone, and by no means fits the communication and control options provided by a globalized world. In other words: Europe, for example, provides excellent supervisory agencies, a whole range of institutions who try to assert fundamental rights against their powerful opponents, e.g. the European Court of Justice, data protection officers, and parliaments.

But paradoxically enough, these institutions fail, even if they work. Because the means of defence they have at hand are restricted to national territories. While we are dealing with global processes, they are bound to use the tools of intervention developed in the last century. This applies, by the way, to all global risks: The national answers and the political and legal instruments our institutions offer can no longer meet the challenges posed by the global risk society today.

All this might sound very pessimistic. Yet, we must go one step further and ask, whether we – social scientists, normal citizens, and users of digital tools – know the right terms in order to describe how profoundly and fundamentally these are transforming our societies and politics. I believe that we lack the categories, maps or compasses we need to navigate the New World. This, again, corresponds to the situation in the global risk society at large. Successful modernization and an escalating technological evolution have catapulted us into fields where we may and must act, without providing us with the vocabulary we need to adequately describe or name these fields and our options for action.

An example might help explain our position concerning the freedom risk. We tend to say that a new digital empire is coming into being. But none of the historical empires we know – neither the Greek, nor the Persian, nor the Roman Empire – was characterized by the features that mark the digital empire of our times.

The digital empire is based on characteristics of modernity which we have not yet truly reflected upon. It does not rely on military violence, nor does it attempt to integrate distant zones politically and culturally into its own realm. However, it exercises the extensive and intensive, profound and far-reaching control that ultimately pushes any individual preference and deficit into the open – we are all becoming transparent.

The traditional concept of the empire, however, does not cover this type of control. In addition, there is an important ambivalence: We provide major tools of control, but the digital control we exercise is extremely vulnerable. The empire of control has not been threatened by a military power, or by a rebellion or revolution, or by war, but by a single and courageous individual. A thirty year-old secret service expert has threatened to topple it by turning the information system against itself. The fact that this kind of control seems unfeasible, and the fact that it is much more vulnerable than we imagine, are the two sides of one and the same coin.

The individual can, indeed, resist the seemingly hyper-perfect system, which is an opportunity that no empire has ever offered before. The brave can resort to counter-power, if they choose to offer resistance on the job. One of the key questions is, therefore, whether we should not oblige the major digital companies to legally implement a whistleblower union and, in particular, the duty of resistance in one’s profession, maybe first on a national scale, and subsequently at European level, etc.

However, John Q. Citizen – unlike Snowden – does not know much about the structures and the power of this so-called empire. The young Columbus travels towards the New World and uses social networks as an extension of his communicating body. The world vision of the new generation incorporates the benefits offered – be it with respect to the organization of protest movements, to global communication, or to digital love. From all we can see, the young do not fear being controlled by the system.

An important consequence becomes evident here. How we assess the risk posed by the violation of freedom rights differs from our assessment of a – perhaps health-related – violation as a consequence of climate change. The violation of our freedom does not hurt. We neither feel it, nor do we suffer a disease, a flood, a lack of opportunities to find a job, and so on. Freedom dies without human beings being physically hurt. The power and legitimacy of the state are based on the promise of security. Freedom comes or seems always secondary. Being a sociologist, I am convinced that the freedom risk is the most fragile among the global risks we have experienced so far.

What should we do? I suggest that we formulate a kind of digital humanism. Let us identify the fundamental right of data protection and digital freedom as a global human right, which must prevail like any other human right, if needs be against all odds.

Is a lesser approach feasible? No, there is no lesser goal. Currently we are being told to apply the new methodologies of encryption in order to protect us from attacks by those who want to track us. This approach, however, implies the individualization of a problem that is, in fact, a global one. And the true catastrophe is, as we have seen, that the catastrophe disappears and becomes invisible, because the control exercised is becoming an increasingly perfect one. This happens to the extent to which our reaction in view of the imminent death of freedom remains an exclusively technical and individual one.

We lack, indeed, an international body to enforce such claims. In this respect there is no difference between the freedom risk and the risk posed by climate change. The litany has always been the same: The nation-state cannot do it. There is no international player who can be addressed either. But there is general concern. The global risk has an enormous power of mobilization that goes far beyond what we have ever had before, e.g. the working class. A crucial factor would be to politically combine the unrest that has activated social movements and political parties in different countries to varying degrees, in order to push them towards the idea mentioned above.

But, is this the way to implement standards on a global scale? The permanent reflection about the dangers for friend and foe alike could, indeed, trigger the creation and implementation of global norms. The sense of what is right or wrong with respect to global norms would result ex post from a global public shock about the violation of these norms. We are bound within a historical development that brings us to this point time and again: We need a transnational invention of politics and democracy.

#### Debating about what policy action to take guarantees the enforcement of sovereignty discourse – unpacking how we understand sovereign politics is a prior question

**Shaw, 99** - Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria (Karena, “Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 569, lexis)

Consequently, politics today is at least as much about probing and rearticulating the limits of how we conceptualize the political as it is about mobilizing resources to include people in existing political arrangements. We cannot assume (and leave others to document) what is going on politically. Nor can we assume how we should come to understand what is going on, or consider it to be obvious, and only debate "what to do." In an important sense it is the obvious that is our greatest enemy. It is in the obvious that our most deeply held assumptions are lodged. Thus, we must simultaneously pursue the questions of what is going on and how we should understand what is going on. We can only pursue these questions through a critical relation to our own categories and assumptions. More precisely, our work must come to grips with the spatial and temporal preconditions for the constitution of subjectivity, political authority and sovereignty. We must come to grips with the architecture articulated by Hobbes, as it is instantiated today. It is through seeing how the spatial and temporal preconditions for the constitution of subjectivity and sovereignty are already being reconstituted and rearticulated that we can come to develop a critical perspective on the categories through which we discipline the political.

#### The focus of the debate should be on exposing the root of social problems – this requires a radical orientation that refuses to accept the confines of legal change

**Shantz, 13 –** professor of critical criminology at Kwantlen Polytechnic University in Surrey, BC. (Jeff, “In Defense of Radicalism”, Radical Criminology, Summer, <http://journal.radicalcriminology.org/index.php/rc/article/view/34/html>

Anti-radicalism is inherently elitist and anti-democratic. It assumes that everyone, regardless of status, has access to channels of political and economic decision-making, and can participate in meaningful ways to address personal or collective needs. It overlooks the exclusion of vast segments of the population from decisions that most impact their lives and the unequal access to social resources that necessitate, that impel, radical changes.

Activists, as well as sociologists and criminologists, must defend radicalism from below as the necessary orientation to struggle against injustice, exploitation, and oppression and for alternative social relations. Actions should be assessed not according to a legal moral framework provided by and reinforced by state capital (for their own benefit). Assessment should be made on real impacts in ending (or hastening the end of) injustice, exploitation, and oppression, on the weakening of state capital. As Martin Luther King suggested, a riot is simply the language of the unheard.

Self-righteous moralizing and reference to legal authority, parroting the voices of state capital, is an abdication of social responsibility for activists. For sociologists and criminologists it is an abandonment of the sociological imagination which in its emphasis on getting to the roots of issues has always been radical (in the non-hegemonic sense). Critical thinkers and actors of all stripes must defend this radicalism. They must become radicals themselves.

Debates should focus on the effectiveness of perspectives and practices in getting to the roots of social problems, of uprooting power. They should not center on fidelity to the law or bourgeois morality. They should not be constrained by the lack of imagination of participants or by the sense that the best of all worlds is the world that power has proposed.

Again, radicalism is not a tactic, an act, an event. It is not a matter of extremes, in a world that takes horrifying extremes for granted. It is an orientation to the world. The features of radicalism are determined by, and in, specific contexts. This is the case now in the context of mass mobilizations, even popular uprisings against statist austerity offensives in the service of neoliberal capitalism. Radicalism always threatens to overflow attempts to contain it. It is because it advances understanding-poses social injustice in stark relief-that it is by nature re/productive. It is, in current terms, viral.

#### The impact is state extermination of the periphery and endless war

**Shaw, 99** - Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria (Karena, “Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 569, lexis)

If sovereignty is broadly constitutive of political possibility, why not simply assume it so that we can get on with our analyses and our progressive practices? As Benhabib notes, many contemporary movements articulate their demands in languages of sovereignty and identity, and thus lend themselves to being read as she does: as demands for identity production or recognition. After all, that these exclusions and violences have been resisted through the appropriation of the same discourses used to effect them-- discourses of sovereignty expressed in identity politics, human rights discourses, humanism--is a testament to the power of sovereignty discourse, and to its domination of discursive spaces of power. So why not accept these demands at "face value" and work to facilitate these ideals, to "include" those previously excluded from the polis, to grant them sovereignty and thus (apparently) political subjectivity? Why not, in other words, accept the ontology of sovereignty--not as perfect, but as what we have to work with-- and turn it to the empowerment of its previous victims? Why not accept the modern state as the container for politics and work to facilitate adequate representation for each and all at the state level?

[\*582] To be clear, this is a necessary strategy under some conditions. But it is also both insufficient and potentially dangerous. The danger of assuming sovereignty is twofold. First, the assumption of sovereignty forecloses the questions that we most need to address, forcing us into a reading of politics that leaves us unable to respond to contemporary political challenges. In particular, the assumption of sovereignty prevents us from subjecting the discourses and practices of sovereignty themselves to the kind of critical scrutiny that is required, given changing material conditions for the production of political authority. Second, if we continue to assume that sovereignty is the necessary precondition for political authority, and thus remain unable to engage the question of its character or appropriateness, we will continue to impose and enforce--however violently--the necessities of sovereignty onto material conditions that may be increasingly resistant to such an imposition. By maintaining the mythology that sovereignty is necessary and natural as a precondition for politics, we will-however unintentionally--continue to sanction the violences done in the name of sovereignty, considering them necessary and natural rather than contingent upon the particularity of the ontology of sovereignty. To open the discourses and practices of sovereignty to question, on the other hand, enables a range of questions about the conditions of possibility for political authority to be opened and engaged. I believe that the future of feminist politics depends upon an engagement with these questions.

The dangers of assuming sovereignty emerge from the ways in which the assumption of sovereignty--the assumption of the necessity of the particular ontological resolutions that have enabled modern political authority--shapes and constrains our thinking about politics and our political action. As I have emphasized, one of the particularly powerful aspects of Hobbes' architecture of sovereignty is that it convincingly persuades us that there is no alternative to sovereignty. It is the necessary precondition for all that is good; all else is war, conflict and violence. If we believe this particular mythology of sovereignty, of course, we will be compelled--as theorists and practitioners of politics--to do everything we can to create, protect and strengthen the ontology of sovereignty; we certainly do not want to be responsible for leading our fellow beings into the alternative. It is this particular element of the architecture of sovereignty discourse that has led to perhaps its greatest violences. Because the ontology of sovereignty is not assumed to be contingent, but necessary and natural, whatever violences go into its production are also rendered necessary and natural rather than political.

However, the ontology of sovereignty is neither natural nor neutral. On the contrary, both the particularity of the ontology of sovereignty and the belief in its necessity have been responsible for incredible violences. It is not difficult to think of many examples of this: the extermination and colonization of indigenous peoples on the grounds that they lacked the social [\*583] and political institutions to survive in the modern world; n36 the exclusion of large numbers of people--not least women--from political authority because they were not adequately "sovereign individuals;" various forms of religious persecution; and so on. In each of these cases, it is the naturalization of the ontology of sovereignty that has produced the victims of sovereignty discourse; they are those who mark the edges of sovereignty: the non-rational, non-modern, and so on. This "othering" in turn enables campaigns to either convert or destroy them as non-sovereign, as dangerous or feeble. But the examples do not end there. Many of the violences that have accompanied recent nationalist struggles are legitimated through the same logics. The necessity of producing a coherent, shared (and ontologically homogeneous) identity has accounted for exclusions and violences in the name of the greater good: the achievement of sovereignty, the precondition for political subjectivity. n37 Given the particularly violent past of sovereignty discourse (or at least its complicity in this past), to continue to assume, or even triumph, sovereignty's necessity or to continue to believe its own account of its necessary alternatives is highly problematic. It certainly runs the risk of perpetuating further violences under its tattered banner.

#### Nationalism leads to Conflict and mass Dehumanization

Klitou 5 [Demetrius Klitou, author of the book The Friends and Foes of Human Rights, BA in International Area Studies and a MA in Diplomatic Studies, pursuing a LL.M. in Public International Law at Leiden University “The Friends and Foes of Human Rights” November 22, 2005, <https://indymedia.org/es/2005/11/828420.shtml>] IQ

I have felt like a citizen of the world from a teenager, ever since I began to feel uncomfortable and perplexed when people asked me where I am from or what nationality do I have. I was, and continue to be, unsure how to answer these questions. Am I an American, or am I a Cypriot, or am I an American-Cypriot. However, I would never answer with the response, “I am a world citizen” or “I am an individual human being;” the response I would like to give. Few people would understand such a response, and many would either laugh at it, or feel insulted. I began to feel that this is exactly the problem with the world. People are not individual human beings; they are national beings. As I became further interested in the subject of human rights, I began to look at other avenues not fully or specifically addressed by its key theorists. I began to believe that cosmopolitanism and individualism were the most valid ideologies for human rights, while nationalism and realism were the most invalid ideologies. I became a staunch idealistic, anti-nationalist, determined to convince others of the negative effects of nationalism and realism on human rights. However, no matter how non-arguable I thought my conviction was, I discovered instead that many people, including many of my own friends and professors, actually feel the opposite way. There are those that truly believe nationalism and realism are positive for human rights. So, I set out to try to prove my conviction using a combination of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, history, law and international relations theory. My methods aim to bridge together human rights with these various fields, something not often attempted. I read dozens of books on human rights, particularly for the purpose of looking for authors who agreed with me, or vice-versa, and to prove that I am not alone. However, given such a topic, my methods are not very precise, nor fully objective, and I admit have substantial normative elements. Nevertheless, it is increasingly being accepted that all theories have normative assumptions, either explicitly or implicitly. I want to be explicit. For the purpose of this article, I will only summarize my argument against nationalism. NATIONALISM If nationalism is, as it has been alleged, “the last refuge of scoundrels,” most of us continue to remain scoundrels in our heart and minds! - Roy C. Macridis (Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes, p. 221) As many scholars argue, such as Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner, nationalism and national identities are modern inventions constructed by the elite and their creations can be traced. Nationalism has been the most pathogenic force in history. It has replaced religion as the dominant “weapon of mass division,” and as such has become the dominant cause of wars, bigotry, fascist regimes and gross human rights violations. The creation of multiple national consciousnesses divides the single global consciousness, creates psychological opposing sides, and epitomizes a nationalized frame of mind of us and them; ours and theirs; we and they; self and anti-self; and the notion of the other. The inward take on identity, created by nationalism, dehumanizes human beings. By classifying similar human beings like zoology classifies different animals, nationalism over emphasizes what distinguishes one nation from another. Human beings have become manifold divided peoples, as opposed to single unified people. A problem that even plagues human rights conventions, such as the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, and the charters of universal institutions, such as the UN Charter’s, “We the Peoples.” The artificial credence of nationalism as the paramount realization of practically every important element of human beings, including identity, culture, social existence, consciousness and political will, strips the ‘human’ element from human beings. The national being replaces the human being. Subsequently, the dehumanization of human beings causes the dehumanization of human rights, also stripping from it the essential ‘human’ element. As a result, human rights have been weakened because humans do not consider the existence of a human identity, or fail to acknowledge that we are all human beings. Human beings are naturally born as human beings, but are immediately and permanently baptized, for example, as a Jordanian, Italian, Colombian or Canadian. They are compelled to attach themselves to one national identity for their entire lifetime, with little opportunity for disaffiliation or re-affiliation. Nationalism denies individuals the freedom to decide and express who they really are or want to be, and thus denies them the right to freedom of speech or expression. As Thomas Franck also argues in his book, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism, the individual choice of identity is a human right prohibited by nationalism. Thus, since these national identities or affiliations are not voluntarily made by autonomous individuals, they are in contest with human rights. When an individual is compelled to be called an American, a Chinese, a Mexican, a Canadian, an Israeli, a German, just to name a few, that person is also compelled to build a psychological wall around him or herself. Groups of individuals behind the same wall share the same national identity. Anyone not behind their designated wall, or not among people of the same national identity, is thus considered an outsider and, in the extreme sense, an intruder. As a sentiment, nationalism invokes an unqualified obedience and loyalty of the individual to both collective entities; the state and nation. In doing so, nationalism feeds on these acquiesces of national solidarity, transforming them into exploitable national loyalties, such as the support for war or the violation of human rights. As a result, nationalism has time after time produced consequences that are grossly criminal. It has time after time caused people to disregard other peoples’ claims to justice and human rights through the practice of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Nationalism fosters hatred and disgust of the other and easily permits the judgement of the other as evil or as the “problem.” The first stages of genocide, revealed by Gregory Stanton, are the following: Classification; Symbolization; Dehumanization. The classification stage categorises the relevant humans into target groups according to their ethnicity or nationality and promotes an ‘us against them’ mind-set. The symbolization stage gives symbols to these groups. The dehumanization stage equates the target group to animals, vermin or disease, and therefore not qualified to make legitimate claims to human rights. This allows the murderers to justify the killing and to overcome the natural revulsion against murder. Nationalism does the same, but permanently and judiciously on a global scale. It dehumanizes humans by depriving them of their innate human qualities and brands non-members of a nation as aliens or sub-humans. Nationalism desensitizes and justifies the wrongs committed by your nation against other nations, causing people to declare, “My country, right or wrong,” no matter how grossly inhumane the actions. The totalitarian ideological movements, fascism and Nazism, were both fuelled by nationalism, national pride and their associated desire for national aggrandizement. Before WWI, nationalism led to a period of excess pride in Germany and their desire to satisfy it. Subsequently, the defeat of Germany and the harsh conditions dictated by the Treaty of Versailles diminished the national pride of Germans. However, extreme nationalism once again led to the intensification of national pride and ultimately facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. Hitler rose to power based on this loss of national pride by making it understood to the Germans that he would do anything to restore it. Furthermore, the Nazi German government invented national myths that incarnated national pride, such as the “pure blood” theory, which aimed to “purify” the nation by killing millions of Jews and other minority, non-German groups. Genocide was seen as a means towards “national rebirth,” and nationalism was used to justify the mass murdering of nations deemed inferior. Thus, as Hans Morgenthau rightfully points out, Nazism is just a degree of nationalism. In Italy, fascism, as another form of extreme nationalism, encouraged Italians and their leaders to embark on imperialistic campaigns to once again regain the glorious pride of conquering other nations deemed inferior. Fascism also advocated for “national salvation” or “national rebirth,” which called for territorial expansion. The human rights violations in the process were inevitable. Mussolini was influenced by the nationalism of Mazzini and the realpolitik of Machiavelli. Nationalism, just like fascism and Nazism, is a form of collectivism, and as such, perceives society in the same fundamental way. It holds that individuals alone have no rights, except as members of a nation. Similar to collectivism, nationalism holds that the individual does not exist separate from the nation and his sole purpose is to be a loyal member of a nation. Nationalists believe individuals alone are not worthy of justice or recognition and lack purpose without a national identity. As a result, the nation is morally superior to the individual. All of this was true in Nazi Germany. In contrary to human rights, the interests of the nation as a whole are held supreme. Nationalism is communicated exceptionally through national anthems. They all generally stress the same themes – unity, loyalty, obedience, sacrifice, death, superiority, pride, bravery, war, military power, glory, ambition, love of the fatherland, motherland or homeland, and “might is right,” often at the expense of human rights and always for the sake of the nation. The following are just five examples of such national anthems. “Millions of hearts with one mind, Brave the enemy's gunfire, March on! Brave the enemy´s gunfire, March on! March on! March on, on!” (China) “War, war without truce against who would attempt to blemish the honor of the fatherland! War, war! The patriotic banners saturate in waves of blood.” (Mexico) “Let us band together, We are ready to die, We are ready to die, Italy has called us.” (Italy) “My homeland, my homeland, my hallowed land, Only to you, is my due hearty love at command, My homeland, my homeland, my hallowed land, Only to you is my due hearty love at command...” (Egypt) “We are the army of God and of our land, We shall never fail when called to sacrifice. Whether braving death, hardship or pain, We give our lives as the price of glory.” (Sudan) Nationalism will continue to serve as a means of the state and the global elite to divide and conquer, and foster unity within a nation for the purpose of maintaining their power. Observable events will carry on dominating headlines, providing empirical evidence of the negative effects of nationalism for human rights. The most recent example, as reported by Isabel Hilton of The Guardian, are the demonstrations which occurred in China this year, where nationalism was and continues to be used by the ruling Communist party to divert the frustration of Chinese on to Japanese in order to maintain power. As a result of its many applications for the benefit of the global elite or those in power, it is fair to predict nationalism will persist well into the future, and thus the human rights movement will remain as a weak force in world politics. In conclusion, until we seize to allow nationalism to be the scoundrel of our hearts and minds, nationalism will continue to be the scoundrel of human rights.

#### The international order of states is an explicitly anti-cosmopolitan order – this order solidifies a constant state of war

Cronin 9 (Colin, Bachelor in Political Science, Associate of a Law Firm, April 18, “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty,” http://www.e-ir.info/2009/04/18/the-dilemma-of-cosmopolitanism-and-state-sovereignty/)

The second position, the morality of states, is derived from the conceptualization of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature. International morality is impossible because of the constant state of war in the absence of a common coercive power. What we have is a collection of different moralities whose source lies in the state. Beitz engages this argument by disputing the claim that international relations is analogous to Thomas Hobbes’ state of nature. He posits that the international system fulfills none of the criteria necessary to be classified as a Hobbesian state of nature.[4] From here, Beitz introduces his idea of international morality. Without specifying its precise content, he argues that there is a standard which imposes requirements on the actions of states without necessarily linking to self-interest.[5] This is the opposite of political realists like Hans Morgenthau, who argued that morality was one thing to be weighed in relation to the greater goal of interest.[6] For Beitz, interest is one thing to be weighed in relation to the greater idea of morality.[7] The basis for a cosmopolitan ideal also conflicts with the way Hedley Bull viewed the international system, as a society of states (or international society). Such a society exists when a group of states are aware of common interests and values, work through common institutions, and “conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another.”[8] While Bull’s conception of international politics is a far cry from the realists’ state of war, it maintains the state as the crucial actor of international relations and shuns cosmopolitanism as viable within the current system.

#### Until the concept of state sovereignty is vanquished there will be no equality

Cronin 9 (Colin, Bachelor in Political Science, Associate of a Law Firm, April 18, “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty,” http://www.e-ir.info/2009/04/18/the-dilemma-of-cosmopolitanism-and-state-sovereignty/)

Because state sovereignty embodies nationalism, the support of world public opinion for nationalism is also support for maintaining the current state system. Of course, there are broad movements of people who argue that all humans are entitled to the same rights. A person suffering in Darfur should receive the same moral consideration as someone enslaved by the Burmese military junta. People in underdeveloped countries are humans just like those in Canada or Britain. But right now, the strength and exclusivity of nationalism prevents the notion of humanity as a single moral community from emerging. Until world public opinion moves away from the current conception of nationalism, cosmopolitan morality will remain impossible because “world society and universal morality [will] not exist.”[52]

#### Our alternative is impossible under the affirmative’s world

Cronin 9 (Colin, Bachelor in Political Science, Associate of a Law Firm, April 18, “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty,” http://www.e-ir.info/2009/04/18/the-dilemma-of-cosmopolitanism-and-state-sovereignty/)

While I argue that universal morality is impossible under the current international system, I do not deny that it is possible for a majority of states to come to a general consensus on the content of morality as it applies to states. For example, virtually all states have signed and ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Putting aside the fact that current adherence to the UDHR is laughable, perfect compliance and enforcement are not required to make the declaration part of an international morality. As with law, a system of moral restraints does not mean that specific rules are never disregarded. In any example where “conformity between actual and prescribed behavior can be regarded as a forgone conclusion,” making rules would be meaningless.[53]

#### The affirmative stands in the way of equality – their state based world order continues a nationalist reign

Cronin 9 (Colin, Bachelor in Political Science, Associate of a Law Firm, April 18, “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty,” http://www.e-ir.info/2009/04/18/the-dilemma-of-cosmopolitanism-and-state-sovereignty/)

The current form of international relations as a system of sovereign states necessarily stands as a barrier to cosmopolitan morality. This is because states are the principal agents of international politics. International morality – whatever its content – rests at the level of the state. It is impossible to conceive of any form of universal morality in a system of sovereign states. The manner in which nationalism can powerfully shape identity is another substantial obstacle to emerging conceptions of global morality and human justice. While a universal political structure such a world state could embody conceptions of cosmopolitan morality, a world society must exist prior to the creation of any form of world government. This makes the odds of a universal morality emerging anytime soon quite low, since the current consensus of world public opinion is more in favor of exclusive nationalism than an embrace of humanity as a single moral community. This is not to say that it will always be impossible to achieve the cosmopolitan morality that Beitz argues for. However, the achievement of such a moral structure will need to accompany the creation of a parallel political structure if it is to last. As long as the source of morality lies in the state, realizing a truly universal morality will remain out of reach for international society.

#### The normative basis of politics must be questioned. The demand for traditional politics foreclose modes of genuine political engagement

Dianna Taylor 03, Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, 2003. “Practicing politics with Foucault and Kant: Toward a critical life,” PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, vol 29, no 3, p. 271.

Grimshaw’s and McNay’s remarks reflect the same criticisms of Foucault’s work that I have addressed in this essay: practices of the self are merely individual; practices of the self are merely aesthetic; Foucault’s articulation of practices of the self lacks normative content. Having addressed ways in which Foucault’s work facilitates the reconceptualization of specific norms, at this point I want to consider the broader, more implicit claim of Grimshaw and McNay that political endeavors require normative foundations. My concern here is less with whether politics does indeed require such foundations than it is with the effects of uncritically assuming their necessity. When normativity is seen as a condition for the possibility of politics it becomes impossible to think about politics in any other terms. Potentially emancipatory ways of thinking and acting which violate or call into question the necessity of prevailing political norms are considered anti-political, opposed to freedom, and are therefore rejected. Hence Foucault’s claims about the link between norms, normalization and oppression: his work points to the oppressive nature of such uncritical rejection and suggests that norms such as freedom can be rethought without being abandoned.

#### Normative agendas doom any analysis of legal practices

Paul Berman 01, Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2001. “Approaches To The Cultural Study Of Law: Telling A Less Suspicious Story,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, p. 123.

Paul Kahn, in his recent book, The Cultural Study of Law, indirectly suggests a possible response to this critique. Kahn encourages sociolegal scholars not to worry so much about being political or social agents of the sort Rorty describes. Instead, he argues that scholars studying law as a cultural system should move "away from normative inquiries into particular reforms and toward thick description of the world of meaning that is the rule of law." If we resist being seduced into focusing on the policy ramifications of our work, Kahn believes, we could better study law the way a religious studies scholar studies religion: not from the perspective of one who is a part of the practice under consideration, but as an independent observer seeking to understand the cultural meaning of the practice from a greater distance. Thus, Kahn argues that it is a mistake for scholars to be too invested in legal practice, regardless of whether they see themselves as law's custodians or law's reformers. Rather, Kahn contends that we would be better off suspending our belief in law's rule altogether, thereby allowing us to analyze legal practice without a normative agenda.

#### Surrendering ourselves to the state and abdicating personal responsibility makes extinction, passivity and structural violence inevitable and guarantees the states grip over all facets of society .

Beres, 94 (Louis Rene, Professor of International Law in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University, Spring,, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Lexis)

By surrendering ourselves to States and to traditional views of self-determination, we encourage not immortality but premature and predictable extinction. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. Although the corrosive calculus of ~eopolitics has now made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations all over the planet turn increasingly to States for securitv. It is the dreadful ingenuity of States that makes possible death in the billions, but it is in the expressions of that ingenuity that people seek safety. Indeed, as the threat of nuclear annihilation looms even after the Cold War, n7 1 the citizens of conflicting States reaffirm their segmented lovalties, moved by the persistent unreason that is, after all, the most indelible badge of modern humankind.

### Femisums and iniquality

#### Cosmopolitanism can be driving force for feminism and equality

Vidmar-Horvat 13 (January 28, Ksenija, Associate Professor at Dept. of Sociology, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, “A Wandering Paradigm, or Is Cosmopolitanism Good for Women?” http://www.querelles.de/index.php/qjb/article/view/3/5)

In this paper, I have compared two kinds of feminist solidarity which form the discursive base of contemporary cosmopolitan feminism. Through a comparative reading of selected authors and their arguments, I have pointed to the pitfalls which risk turning cosmopolitanism into an academic endeavour with no practical and/or political effect. The result of my comparison is that cosmopolitanism, as conceptualised by feminists, may have no impact on the actual lives of women who suffer the consequences of either national or postcolonial violence. Therefore, it is important to think of cosmopolitism in a multi-perspectival way. I have tried to suggest one such trajectory for cosmopolitan discourses, which may yield a fresh perspective on both sides of the feminist argument. Most importantly, the multi-perspectival cosmopolitan ethos stands a better chance of embodying the social vulnerability of the world’s most deprived. This, after all, is the desired outcome of the effort to reconstruct cosmopolitan politics and its hegemonic Western reiterations.

#### Without the alternative there can be no global equality

Cronin 9 (Colin, Bachelor in Political Science, Associate of a Law Firm, April 18, “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty,” http://www.e-ir.info/2009/04/18/the-dilemma-of-cosmopolitanism-and-state-sovereignty/)

Imagine attempting to achieve distributive justice on a world scale under the current state system. Although the concept of distributive justice has been defined in different ways, we can consider its fundamental principle to be a more equal allocation of rights and resources among all people in a given society (city, state, world, etc.) based on their need.[61] Beitz’s international distributive justice stems from the ideas of states as interdependent cooperatives and the natural distribution of resources as morally arbitrary.[62] Taken to its logical end, Beitz’s argument is that states do not have inherent entitlements to resources and that they should distribute these resources among humanity as a whole, giving more to those who need more. The problem with this principle of international distributive justice in a world of sovereign states is that it views the world in terms of humans when the main political unit is still the state. Global distributive justice conceives of world order with humans as the principal unit, but under a system of state sovereignty any “framework of international order is inhospitable” to these cosmopolitan forms of justice and morality.[63]

## FW

### FW- K=Prior Question

#### Domestic focus proves the aff is committed to the nation-state as the starting point for policy analysis. We need to start with transnational cosmopolitan methods to break down nationalist frames.

Beck and Sznaider 6 [Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, Professor of sociology at Munich's Ludwig-Maximilian University and the London School of Economics; and professor of sociology at the Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, Israel. “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda,” The British Journal of Sociology 57.1, Wiley InterSciences." March 2006

Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization. The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions:

[Like] stamp collecting . . . social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the American constitution, the British class system – not to mention the more exotic institutions of tribal societies – were the currency of social research. The core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated– in the sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world civilization as wholes but with the ‘domestic’ forms of particular national societies (Shaw 2000: 68).

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. One does not criticize methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual. Nation-states (as all the research shows – see also the different contributions in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? It adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. The decisive point is that national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science. As many authors – including the ones in this volume – criticize, in the growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, difference is that in the case of nationalism the value judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodological nationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities. In the case of the cosmopolitan ‘Wertbeziehung’ (Max Weber, value relation), by contrast, **this silent commitment to a nation-state centred outlook of sociology appears problematic**. In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distinguish between the actor perspective and the observer perspective. From this it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination within the context of its cultural, political and even geographical boundaries and distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism **assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given** and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of society and politics. **These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences**. Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the nation-state's own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics, law, justice, memory and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, **much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of the nationstate**. That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner's paper in this issue (Turner 2006: 133–51). This does not mean, of course, that a cosmopolitan social science can and should ignore different national traditions of law, history, politics and memory. These traditions exist and become part of our cosmopolitan methodology. The comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism. This is valid to the extent that the majority of positions in the contemporary debates in social and political science over globalization can be systematically interpreted as transdisciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism. **These premises also structure empirical research, for example, in the choice of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusively national**. A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is therefore difficult, indeed, almost impossible, because so many statistical categories and research procedures are based on it. It is therefore of historical importance for the future development of the social sciences that this methodological nationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and disciplinary organization, be theoretically, empirically, and organizationally re-assessed and reformed. What is at stake here? Whereas in the case of the nation-state centred perspective there is an historical correspondence between normative and methodological nationalism (and for this reason this correspondence has mainly remained latent), this does not hold for the relationship between normative and methodological cosmopolitanism. In fact, the opposite is true: even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of reference. Cosmopolitan social science entails the systematic breaking up of the process through which the national perspective of politics and society, as well as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and law, confirm and strengthen each other in their definitions of reality. Thus it also tackles (what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of conspiracy of silence of conflicting basic convictions) the various developmental versions of de-bounded politics and society, corresponding research questions and programmes, the strategic expansions of the national and international political fields, as well as basic transformations in the domains of state, politics, and society. This paradigmatic de-construction and re-construction of the social sciences from a national to a cosmopolitan outlook can be understood and methodologically justified as a ‘positive problem shift’ (Lakatos 1970), **a broadening of horizons for social science research making visible new realities encouraging new research programmes** (Back and Lau 2005 and Beck, Banss and Lau 2003: 1–35). Against the background of cosmopolitan social science, it suddenly becomes obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor, correspondingly, to make a convincing contrast between homogeneous units. National spaces have become de-nationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. New realities are arising: a new mapping of space and time, new co-ordinates for the social and the political are emerging which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated.

### Value to life OW

#### Number of lives saved is irrelevant if the lives are just a prolongation of suffering.

Appiah 06

2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. <http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev_4_08_Appiah_Review.pdf> //QM

But the Shallow Pond arguments raise more empirical concerns, to which, as I promised, I now return. Consider the factual claim that UNICEF can save the lives of thirty children for $100. What does this mean? It doesn’t, of course, mean that you can keep them alive forever. Part of the reason UNICEF or OXFAM—both well-run organizations full of well-intentioned people doing much good—can keep sending those letters is that they have to save the same children over and over again. You send the check. Even if, per impossible, your money could be traced to a particular village in Bangladesh, rehydrating thirty particular children who would otherwise have died of their diarrhea, you are not thereby making a serious contribution to the real improvement of their life chances. Death isn’t the only thing that matters. What matters is decent lives. And if what you save them for is just another month or another year or another decade of horrible suffering, have you really made the best use of your money? Indeed, have you really made the world less bad?

# AFF AT

## Turn- Imperialism

#### Their cosmopolitan ethic will be redeployed towards imperial ends

Turner and Cooper 13 [Mandy Turner, director of the Kenyon Institute, former lecturer in conflict resolution at the University of Bradford, former research fellow at the University of Bradford, Neil Cooper, PhD, professor of international security studies at the University of Bradford, MA in international relations, June 14th 2013, “The Iron First of Liberal Intervention Inside the Glove of Kantian Idealism: A Response to Burke,” *Critical Studies on Security* Volume 1 Number 1]

However, we want to focus on some aspects of the article which are problematic and¶ which underscore some of the more general problems with both cosmopolitan and liberal¶ approaches to security and global governance. The first problem relates to the need for a¶ more nuanced discussion of cosmopolitan thinking about security. Although Burke is¶ concerned, for example, to distinguish his cosmopolitanism from the likes of Linklater¶ and Nussbaum, it is also the case that insofar as existing cosmopolitan thinking on¶ security is discussed, via the work of Kaldor and Booth, this is largely treated as a¶ relatively homogenised body of work. Instead, it would be more apt to suggest that¶ these represent different traditions of cosmopolitanism that imply more or less radical¶ projects of transformation. For example, Kaldor’s cosmopolitanism fits more comfortably¶ within a liberal tradition that runs in a direct line all the way back to Kant. In contrast,¶ Booth is representative of a more critical cosmopolitan tradition that embraces Kant but¶ mainlines the Frankfurt School. Both Kaldor and Booth may end up advocating cosmopolitan solutions, but one gets there via an essentially liberal positivist tradition of¶ thinking, the other via a broadly critical and post-positivist approach. Notwithstanding¶ the debate over whether those drawing on critical theory are just liberals in disguise (Paris¶ 2010), there are important differences in both the content of their analysis and their radical¶ prescriptions for a just security order. As Burke himself acknowledges, it is also striking¶ how often states (or rather state officials) legitimise national interest, imperialism and¶ military adventurism by drawing on cosmopolitan precepts (e.g. Blair’s doctrine of the¶ international community). Of course, there is a strong element of cant in the invocation of¶ Kant (either explicitly or implicitly) by policy-makers – and it is certainly the case that (in¶ some respects), the link between cosmopolitan principles and practice can often appear¶ downright contradictory. For Burke, this means these are not authentically cosmopolitan¶ approaches. Critics, on the other hand, retort that the universalist claims of cosmopolitanism inevitably produce the kind of imperial policies practiced by politicians such as Blair¶ or Obama or legitimised by the responsibility to protect philosophy (Cunliffe 2012). We¶ have more sympathy with the critics than with Burke, but think it is more accurate to¶ describe the rationalisations of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo or Libya as typical of¶ a strand of what might be termed realpolitik security cosmopolitanism, however contradictory this may appear to be. The article would have been strengthened if it had done¶ more to reflect on these different traditions.

## Perm

#### Perm solves --- adoption of a global identity does not require rejection of a national identity

O’Byrne 03 [Darren J. O’Byrne, Lecturer in Sociology and Cultural Studies at the University of Surrey Roehampton, UK. “World Citizenship, The Dimensions of Global Citizenship: Political Identity beyond the Nation-State”, p. 167-8.] IQ

We have discussed at length the ways in which the discourse of world citizenship is constructed by those who claim to practise it as a matter of course. We have also seen how these practitioners develop the discourse for use in documentation, such as the World Passport, which are aimed at assisting people (such as refugees) in their daily lives. Central to this understanding of global citizenship are globality and political identity. Citizenship, I have stated, contains no inherent properties which necessarily associate it solely with the nation-state, and, indeed, the nation-state has never been the only source of political identity. Political identities are fluent, socially-and pragmatically-constructed labels which draw on, and between, a variety of experiences which operate at the level of the individual lifeworld. In this respect, we can follow Giddens in understanding how, in a late modernity characterized by increasing reflexivity, the politicization of identity (an identity which is constructed through the various choices made available to the individual) takes place within the post-traditional, globalized realm of life politics. Accordingly, global citizenship need not be restricted to those who dedicate their lives to such movements. Individuals can and do practise it on a daily basis. However, this **does not mean that a self-conscious acceptance or advocacy of some form of world or global citizenship excludes any other identification**, such as with the nation-state or with a transnational cultural community. It is not at all true to say that, in the everyday lives of people, a conscious decision must be made by each individual which sets national identity against some kind of global, transnational or postnational identity. Instead, we must realize that, pragmatically if nothing else, such individuals do retain some kind of nation-state citizenship. As Calhoun, Miller and others have stated, political identity is constructed through a variety of group affiliations and cultural categories, which include gender, religion, ethnicity, occupation, and that national identity is itself constructed through such contested sources as language and territory. 2 The same must be said for world citizenship: it is constructed through a variety of strategies, which of course include the national and local levels. This is even more significant when we discuss what I have termed global citizenship, given that this must, and does, reject homogenizing assumptions in favour of appreciating diversity and difference in a multicultural world. If we have learned anything from the postmodern critique of social science, it is surely that there is no one, universal explanation for such contested and diverse phenomena as identity. So even the construction of the most local, or national, of political identities is itself a rich source of information about the emergence of a new form of world citizenship.

## Alt fails

### AT cosmo alt

#### Cosmopolitanism is Just a Dream

Douthat 16’ (Ross Douthat, July 2, 2016, Douthat attended [Hamden Hall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamden_Hall_Country_Day_School), a private high school in [Hamden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamden,_Connecticut), Connecticut. Douthat graduated [magna cum laude](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna_cum_laude) from [Harvard University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) in 2002, where he was also elected to [Phi Beta Kappa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phi_Beta_Kappa). While there he contributed to [The Harvard Crimson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Harvard_Crimson) and edited the [Harvard Salient](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_Salient). Douthat is a regular blogger and columnist for [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times).[[10]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ross_Douthat#cite_note-10) He is the youngest regular op-ed writer in the New York Times. Before joining The New York Times, he was a senior editor at [The Atlantic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Atlantic).[[13]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ross_Douthat#cite_note-13) His published books are Bad Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics (2012), Grand New Party (2008) with [Reihan Salam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reihan_Salam), and Privilege: Harvard and the Education of the Ruling Class (2005). He frequently appeared on the video debate site [Bloggingheads.tv](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloggingheads.tv) until 2012, New York Times, “The Myth of Cosmopolitanism”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/the-myth-of-cosmopolitanism.html>, AA)

The people who consider themselves “cosmopolitan” in today’s West, by contrast, are part of [a meritocratic order](http://www.iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_article_2016_Summer_Andrews.php) that transforms difference into similarity, by plucking the best and brightest from everywhere and homogenizing them into the peculiar species that we call “global citizens.” This species is racially diverse (within limits) and eager to assimilate the fun-seeming bits of foreign cultures — food, a touch of exotic spirituality. But no less than Brexit-voting Cornish villagers, our global citizens think and act as members of a tribe. They have their own distinctive worldview (basically liberal Christianity without Christ), their own common educational experience, their own shared values and assumptions (social psychologists call these [WEIRD](http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/05/weird_psychology_social_science_researchers_rely_too_much_on_western_college.html) — for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic), and of course [their own outgroups](http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/30/i-can-tolerate-anything-except-the-outgroup/) (evangelicals, Little Englanders) to fear, pity and despise. And like any tribal cohort they seek comfort and familiarity: From London to Paris to New York, each Western “global city” (like each “global university”) is increasingly interchangeable, so that wherever the citizen of the world travels he already feels at home. Indeed elite tribalism is actively encouraged by the technologies of globalization, the ease of travel and communication. Distance and separation force encounter and immersion, which is why the age of empire made cosmopolitans as well as chauvinists — sometimes out of the same people. (There is more genuine cosmopolitanism in Rudyard Kipling and T. E. Lawrence and Richard Francis Burton than in a hundred Davos sessions.)

#### Cosmopolitanism Cannot Work Economically

Kleingeld and Brown 14’ (Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 2014, Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (1995) and the editor of Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace' and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (2006). She is also the Winner of the 2013 NAKS Biennial Book Prize. Eric Brown is an associate professor of philosophy as well as the director of graduate studies in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He got a Ph.D at University of Chicago and his research is mainly in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and ethics.  He is the author of Stoic Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge U.P., forthcoming) and essays on a wide range of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In addition to the essays listed below, he has recently contributed chapters to Blackwell's Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Companion to Socrates, and Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought; to The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism and The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought; and to The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (this is the updated version), Edward N. Zalta (editor), Cosmopolitanism, AA)

Various arguments have been used to show that economic cosmopolitanism is not a viable option. Marx and later Marxists have argued that capitalism is self-destructive in the long run, because the exploitation, alienation, and poverty that it inflicts on the proletariat will provoke a world-wide revolution that will bring about the end of capitalism. In the twentieth century, when nationalist tendencies proved to be stronger (or in any case more easily mobilized) than international solidarity, and when the position of workers was strengthened to the point of making them unwilling to risk a revolution, this forced the left to reconsider this view. Critics of the economic cosmopolitan ideal have also started to emphasize another way in which capitalism bears the seeds of its own destruction within itself, namely, insofar as it is said to lead to a global environmental disaster that might spell the end of the human species, or in any event the end of capitalism as we know it. The effects of excessive consumption (in some parts of the world) and the exploitation of nature would make the earth inhospitable to future human generations. Even if one does not think that these first two problems are so serious as to make economic cosmopolitanism unviable, they can still make it seem undesirable in the eyes of those who are concerned with poverty and environmental destruction. Moreover, there are several other concerns that lead critics to regard economic cosmopolitanism as undesirable. First among these is the lack of effective democratic control by the vast majority of the world's population, as large multinationals are able to impose demands on states that are in a weak economic position and their populations, demands that they cannot reasonably refuse to meet, although this does not mean that they meet them fully voluntarily. This concerns, for example, labor conditions or the use of raw materials in so-called Third World countries. Second, economic cosmopolitans are accused of failing to pay attention to a number of probable side-effects of a global free market. In particular, they are criticized for neglecting or downplaying issues such as (a) the vast inequality of wealth and extreme poverty without there being any reliable mechanism to provide relief, if they reduce the role of political institutions (b) the presupposition of large-scale migration or re-schooling when jobs disappear in one area (the loss of ties to friends and family, language, culture, etc., and the monetary costs of moving or re-tooling), (c) the lack of a guarantee that there will be a sufficient supply of living-wage jobs for all world citizens (especially given increasing automation. They are similarly accused of failing to take seriously the fact that there might be circumstances under which it would be profitable for some states to be protectionist or wage war, such as wars about markets or raw materials and energy (e.g., oil).

### AT world government alt

#### The cosmopolitan idea of a world government would never work, prefer our specific warrants.

Appiah 06

2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. <http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev_4_08_Appiah_Review.pdf> //QM

First, the primary mechanism for ensuring these entitlements remains the nation-state. There are a few political cosmopolitans who say they want a world government. But the cosmopolitanism I am defending prizes a variety of political arrangements, provided, of course, each state grants every individual what he or she deserves. A global state would have at least three obvious problems. It could easily accumulate uncontrollable power, which it might use to do great harm; it would often be unresponsive to local needs; and it would almost certainly reduce the variety of institutional experimentation from which all of us can learn. Accepting the nation-state means accepting that we have a special responsibility for the life and the justice of our own; but we still have to play our part in ensuring that all states respect the rights and meet the needs of their citizens. If they cannot, then all of us—through our nations, if they will do it, and in spite of them, if they won’t—share the collective obligation to change them; and if the reason they fail their citizens is that they lack resources, providing resources can be part of that collective obligation. That is an equally fundamental cosmopolitan commitment.

But, second, our obligation is not to carry the whole burden alone. Each of us should do our fair share; but we cannot be required to do more. This is a constraint, however inchoate, that the Shallow Pond theorists do not respect. The Singer principle just doesn’t begin to capture the subtlety of our actual moral thought. A different philosopher’s story, this one offered by Richard W. Miller, makes the point. An adult is plummeting from a tenth-story window, and you, on the sidewalk below, know that you can save that person’s life by cushioning his fall. If you did so, however, you would very likely suffer broken bones, which would heal, perhaps painfully and imperfectly, over a period of months. (Suppose you know all this because you’re an orthopedic surgeon.) To Miller it’s clear that you can do your “fair share in making the world a better place while turning down this chance for world-improvement.”9 Since the death you failed to prevent is worse than a few months of suffering, the Singer principle, of course, says otherwise. Our ordinary moral thinking makes distinctions the principle doesn’t capture.